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ABSTRACT—While litigation continues in an effort to establish a
fundamental right to education under the U.S. Constitution, the full historical
justification for this right remains missing—a fatal flaw for many jurists.
This Article fills that gap, demonstrating that the central, yet entirely
overlooked, justification for a federal right to education resides in America’s
education story during the era of slavery and Reconstruction.
At that time, education was first and foremost about freedom. The South
had criminalized education to maintain a racialized hierarchy that preserved
slavery. Many African-Americans, seeing education as the means to both
mental and physical freedom, made extraordinary efforts to secretly acquire
it. After the War, their efforts morphed into a full-fledged public education
movement. Congress, aiming to remedy slavery and repair democracy itself,
responded by requiring Confederate states to guarantee education in their
state constitutions. The rest of the nation followed shortly thereafter.
This Article analyzes this history through the Thirteenth Amendment,
the Fourteenth Amendment, the Guarantee Clause, and subsequent judicial
precedent. It demonstrates, first, that the Constitution has long protected a
negative right to education—the freedom to pursue learning without state
interference. Second, it reveals how that negative right transformed into an
affirmative one in the years immediately following the Civil War. By
anchoring the right to education in multiple constitutional provisions, this
Article demonstrates that the right to education permeates the very fabric of
our constitutional democracy.
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INTRODUCTION
Public education has reached a troubling crossroads. Public school
funding is in generational decline,1 while segregation and inequality are
steadily increasing.2 Since the Great Recession, states have substantially
reduced their fiscal effort for public education, exacting a $600 billion loss
1

See MICHAEL LEACHMAN, NICK ALBARES, KATHLEEN MASTERSON & MARLANA WALLACE, CTR.
BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, MOST STATES HAVE CUT SCHOOL FUNDING, AND SOME CONTINUE
CUTTING 1 (2016), https://www.cbpp.org/research/state-budget-and-tax/most-states-have-cut-schoolfunding-and-some-continue-cutting [https://perma.cc/7HBD-PBNM] (finding that thirty-one states were
still funding education below prerecession levels); MICHAEL LEACHMAN & ERIC FIGUEROA, CTR. ON
BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, K-12 SCHOOL FUNDING UP IN MOST 2018 TEACHER-PROTEST STATES,
BUT STILL WELL BELOW DECADE AGO 4–6 (2019), https://www.cbpp.org/research/state-budget-and-tax/
k-12-school-funding-up-in-most-2018-teacher-protest-states-but-still [https://perma.cc/W6UF-QNLR]
(finding that several were funding education below pre-recession levels).
2 See GARY ORFIELD, JONGYEON EE, ERICA FRANKENBERG & GENEVIEVE SIEGEL-HAWLEY, C.R.
PROJECT, BROWN AT 62: SCHOOL SEGREGATION BY RACE, POVERTY AND STATE 3 (2016), https://
www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/integration-and-diversity/brown-at-62-schoolsegregation-by-race-poverty-and-state/Brown-at-62-final-corrected-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/KL2J-JE95]
(indicating that the percentage of intensely segregated minority schools has tripled since 1988); NATASHA
USHOMIRSKY & DAVID WILLIAMS, EDUC. TR., FUNDING GAPS 2015: TOO MANY STATES STILL SPEND
LESS ON EDUCATING STUDENTS WHO NEED THE MOST 1 (2015), https://edtrust.org/wp-content/
uploads/2014/09/FundingGaps2015_TheEducationTrust1.pdf [https://perma.cc/M5DQ-G92U] (finding
a $1,200 funding gap per student in school districts with the highest poverty rates and a $2,000 gap
between school districts serving “the most students of color and those serving the fewest”); BRUCE D.
BAKER, MARK WEBER, AJAY SRIKANTH, ROBERT KIM & MICHAEL ATZBI, THE REAL SHAME OF THE
NATION: THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF INTERSTATE INEQUITY IN PUBLIC SCHOOL INVESTMENTS
1 (2018), https://www.shankerinstitute.org/sites/default/files/The%20Real%20Shame%20of%20the%20
Nation.pdf [https://perma.cc/243F-GWFE] (calculating the funding gap between what students need and
what states currently spend).
ON
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on schools nationally.3 In Michigan, the loss is nearly $5,000 per student
annually—the equivalent of more than $2 million a year in an average-sized
school.4 At the same time, efforts to privatize education have finally taken
hold and are accelerating rapidly.5 Going forward, the paths towards a
revitalized public education look increasingly fraught.
A fundamental right to education under the U.S. Constitution is one of
the few remaining hopes for millions of students.6 While the Court refused
to recognize a right to education in San Antonio Independent School District
v. Rodriguez in 1973, it left open the possibility that different facts and
theories might implicate a right to education.7 Advocates, hoping to finally
seize on that opening, have filed cases in four different federal circuits.8
Scholarship on the topic has, likewise, flourished.9
The central theoretical thread necessary to secure the right to education,
however, remains almost entirely unnoticed: the role of education in slavery

3 DANIELLE FARRIE & DAVID G. SCIARRA, EDUC. L. CTR., $600 BILLION LOST: STATE
DISINVESTMENT IN EDUCATION FOLLOWING THE GREAT RECESSION 2 (2021), https://files.eric.ed.gov/
fulltext/ED612474.pdf [https://perma.cc/DP63-R8GX].
4 Id. at 8; see NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., OVERVIEW OF PUBLIC ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY
SCHOOLS AND DISTRICTS: SCHOOL YEAR 1999-2000, at tbl.5 (2001), https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2001/
overview/table05.asp [https://perma.cc/7734-2QUC].
5 JACK SCHNEIDER & JENNIFER BERKSHIRE, A WOLF AT THE SCHOOLHOUSE DOOR: THE
DISMANTLING OF PUBLIC EDUCATION AND THE FUTURE OF SCHOOL, at xiii–xxi (2020) (detailing the
ideological and practical expansion of private school choice at the expense of public education).
6 State supreme courts have addressed several of these problems but produced uneven results and, in
several states, have even held that school quality and funding are nonjusticiable issues. See generally
Joshua E. Weishart, Rethinking Constitutionality in Education Rights Cases, 72 ARK. L. REV. 491, 497
(2019) (analyzing the ineffectiveness of state courts even when they have intervened); Scott R. Bauries,
Is There an Elephant in the Room?: Judicial Review of Educational Adequacy and the Separation of
Powers in State Constitutions, 61 ALA. L. REV. 701, 741 n.223 (2010) (listing courts rejecting claims as
nonjusticiable).
7 See 411 U.S. 1, 36–37 (1973).
8 See Gary B. v. Whitmer, 957 F.3d 616, 620–21 (6th Cir. 2020), reh’g en banc granted, opinion
vacated, 958 F.3d 1216 (6th Cir.); Williams v. Reeves, 954 F.3d 729, 731 (5th Cir. 2020); Williams ex
rel. J.E. v. Reeves, 981 F.3d 437, 437 (5th Cir. 2020); A.C. v. Raimondo, 494 F. Supp. 3d 170, 170 (D.R.I.
2020); Martinez v. Malloy, 350 F. Supp. 3d 74, 79 (D. Conn. 2018). Gary B. was the first federal court
since the three-judge panel in Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School District, 337 F. Supp. 280
(W.D. Tex. 1971), rev’d, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), to recognize a right to education. One of the litigants
indicated an intention to go to the Supreme Court. Megan Lunny & Adina Cazacu-De Luca, “The Wheels
of Justice Clank Slowly”: Michael Rebell’s Ongoing Fight for Education Reform, COLUM. SPECTATOR
(Dec. 1, 2020), https://www.columbiaspectator.com/the-eye/2020/12/01/the-wheels-of-justice-clankslowly-michael-rebells-ongoing-fight-for-education-reform/ [https://perma.cc/87QB-6NFE].
9 See, e.g., Derek W. Black, Implying a Federal Right to Education, in A FEDERAL RIGHT TO
EDUCATION: FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS FOR OUR DEMOCRACY 135, 135–36 (Kimberly Jenkins
Robinson ed., 2019) (discussing the right to education and surveying the expanding literature); see also
infra note 24 (listing current scholarship that develops theories for the recognition of a federal right to
education under the U.S. Constitution).
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and Reconstruction.10 This thread grounds the justification for the right to
education in history, not just theory. African-Americans’ experiences with
education—or lack thereof—during and after slavery reveal that the right to
education encompasses interests much more fundamental to human life than
those discussed today. At the time of slavery and Reconstruction, education
was first and foremost about freedom.11 In more formal terms, education was
understood to be a necessary condition of full freedom.
The South criminalized reading, writing, and other forms of mental
instruction for enslaved people.12 That criminalization of education,
moreover, was not merely an incidental condition of slavery. It was a tool
used to enforce the enslavement of African-Americans both physically and
mentally.13 Many enslaved people also recognized the value of education and
secretly acquired it at the risk of death, prizing education as a key to mental
freedom and potentially full freedom.14 During and after the Civil War, those
secret efforts then morphed into organized campaigns to claim the right to
education.15 These campaigns and Congress’s realization that a system of
education was crucial to remedying slavery and rebuilding democracy in the

10 The most extensive examination of slavery and education is four sentences and a string citation.
See Gary B., 957 F.3d at 650–51. The Supreme Court’s seminal education rights case, Rodriguez, does
not mention slavery or Reconstruction at all. 411 U.S. at 1. This flaw is arguably fatal, as “it is
inconceivable that the Court could decide major federalism cases without mentioning the Civil War era.”
Justin Collings, The Supreme Court and the Memory of Evil, 71 STAN. L. REV. 265, 337 (2019).
11 See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER M. SPAN, FROM COTTON FIELD TO SCHOOLHOUSE: AFRICAN AMERICAN
EDUCATION IN MISSISSIPPI, 1862–1875, at 43 (2009) (discussing education and freedom); HILARY
GREEN, EDUCATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION: AFRICAN AMERICAN SCHOOLS IN THE URBAN SOUTH, 1865–
1890, at 44 (2016) (finding education was “essential in preparing [African-Americans] to become
freemen”); HEATHER ANDREA WILLIAMS, SELF-TAUGHT: AFRICAN AMERICAN EDUCATION IN SLAVERY
AND FREEDOM 35–36 (2005) (discussing how eagerly newly freed people approached literacy and
education); JANET DUITSMAN CORNELIUS, WHEN I CAN READ MY TITLE CLEAR: LITERACY, SLAVERY,
AND RELIGION IN THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH 2 (1992) (describing literacy as “the freedom to become a
person”).
12 See, e.g., United States v. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. 785, 793 (C.C.D. Ky. 1866) (discussing a Louisiana
law prohibiting persons from teaching enslaved people how to read or write, with violations punishable
by imprisonment or death).
13 Lynch v. Alabama, No. 08-S-450-NE, 2011 WL 13186739, at *153 (N.D. Ala. Nov. 7, 2011)
(discussing “the resolve of whites during this period to totally control the thoughts and attitudes of all
blacks”), aff’d in part, vacated in part, remanded sub nom., I.L. v. Alabama, 739 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir.
2014). See generally BRITISH & FOREIGN ANTI-SLAVERY SOC’Y, SLAVERY AND THE INTERNAL SLAVE
TRADE IN THE UNITED STATES OF NORTH AMERICA 194–96 (1841) (survey of anti-literacy and antilearning laws in the South); Gelsey G. Beaubrun, Talking Black: Destigmatizing Black English and
Funding Bi-Dialectal Education Programs, 10 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 196, 203–09 (2020) (discussing
slave revolts and surveying the literacy prohibitions that followed).
14 See SPAN, supra note 11, at 43; GREEN, supra note 11, at 44; DEREK W. BLACK, SCHOOLHOUSE
BURNING: PUBLIC EDUCATION AND THE ASSAULT ON AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 73–94 (2020) (exploring
the multiple links between education and freedom for enslaved people).
15 See infra Section I.A.4.
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South triggered a cascading series of events, policies, and constitutional
developments.
The Thirteenth Amendment, ratified shortly after the Civil War,
ensured the physical freedom of enslaved people and extended Congress the
authority to pursue some education remedies, but the Amendment alone did
not ensure access to education or the broader rights necessary for meaningful
freedom.16 Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment addressed some of those
limits, explicitly extending citizenship, privileges and immunities, liberty,
and more to formerly enslaved people.17 But the Fourteenth Amendment
would have had little effect if individuals lacked the knowledge and skills
necessary to exercise those rights. This was true for both formerly enslaved
people and many white individuals.18 Citizens needed to actually receive an
education, not just the theoretical freedom to pursue it.19
Reconstruction provided Congress with the opportunity to finally
correct the nation’s earlier education failures while also addressing the
effects of slavery.20 The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments had
inverted the constitutional structure from one where Congress’s authority
over states was almost nonexistent to one where Congress’s power,
particularly to protect individual rights and remedy slavery, was expansive.21
16 See generally KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE
CONSTITUTION 50–57 (1989) (discussing barriers to full participation in society even following the
Thirteenth Amendment).
17 Id. at 51–52.
18 See Susan P. Leviton & Matthew H. Joseph, An Adequate Education for All Maryland’s Children:
Morally Right, Economically Necessary, and Constitutionally Required, 52 MD. L. REV. 1137, 1155
(1993) (discussing how Maryland “antireformers” had restricted education for whites too).
19 See, e.g., Testimony by a South Carolina Freedman Before the American Freedmen’s Inquiry
Commission (June 1863), reprinted in THE WARTIME GENESIS OF FREE LABOR: THE LOWER SOUTH 250,
250–54 (Ira Berlin, Thavola Glymph, Steven F. Miller, Joseph P. Reddy, Leslie S. Rowland & Julie
Saville eds., 1990) (discussing the skills and knowledge necessary for African-Americans to fully exercise
their rights); WILLIAMS, supra note 11, at 149–50 (discussing the problem of white hostility against
school attendance by Black schoolchildren).
20 See infra Section III.D. The Northwest Ordinance of 1785, for instance, had laid the ground rules
for statehood outside the original colonies and required that every new town in every new state reserve
its center lot to construct schools and several outer-lying lots to generate resources for those schools.
Public Land Ordinance of 1785, reprinted in 1 LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 563, 565
(Philadelphia, John Boren, W. John Duane & R.C. Weightman 1815); see also Papasan v. Allain,
478 U.S. 265, 268 (1986) (acknowledging that before the Constitution, Congress required states to reserve
land for public schools—a practice followed by most states). Those well-intentioned measures, however,
proved insufficient to support and expand a system of education, and the South, of course, had actively
undermined education.
21 See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59 (1996) (“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment, by
expanding federal power at the expense of state autonomy, had fundamentally altered the balance of state
and federal power struck by the Constitution.” (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976)));
see also William J. Rich, Taking “Privileges or Immunities” Seriously: A Call to Expand the
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Congress, pursuant to the Guarantee Clause, now had the power to set the
terms of Southern states’ readmission to the Union. These power shifts,
combined with Congress’s recognition that a more forceful approach to
education was necessary, led Congress to demand that states provide for
public education in their constitutions prior to rejoining the Union.22
The right to education, when accurately accounting for this history,
builds upon the primary role public education played in transitions from
slavery to freedom, liberty, and citizenship—and the nation’s recommitment
to its founding ideals. My prior article, The Constitutional Compromise to
Guarantee Education, offers a precise historical justification for the right to
education but still falls short of a full explanation.23 In focusing almost
exclusively on the readmission process for Southern states from 1867 to
1870, that earlier article overlooks extensive federal education efforts prior
to 1867 and the central role education had long played as the dividing line
between slavery and freedom.
As a result, that article and the various other conventional arguments
for a federal education right suffer two fundamental flaws. First, they tend to
narrowly define the nature of the right to education in terms of school quality
and learning outcomes24 and, thereby, overlook the importance of education
to human freedom and the Constitution’s overall system of democratic
government. Second and relatedly, they locate the right solely in the

Constitutional Canon, 87 MINN. L. REV. 153, 200 (2002) (“The Civil War Amendments changed the
relationship between state and federal citizenship, putting to rest arguments about the supremacy of state
sovereignty.”).
22 Derek W. Black, The Constitutional Compromise to Guarantee Education, 70 STAN. L. REV. 735,
766 (2018) (“Education was specifically mandated in every new Southern constitution and implicit in the
republican form of government Congress demanded pursuant to its own existing constitutional
authority.”).
23 See id.
24 See, e.g., Barry Friedman & Sara Solow, The Federal Right to an Adequate Education, 81 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 92, 110 (2013) (arguing for a right to adequate education); Stuart Biegel, Reassessing the
Applicability of Fundamental Rights Analysis: The Fourteenth Amendment and the Shaping of
Educational Policy After Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 1078, 1081–84
(1989) (analyzing applicability of the Equal Protection Clause to educational opportunity); Goodwin Liu,
Education, Equality, and National Citizenship, 116 YALE L.J. 330, 345–48 (2006) (arguing for education
as a right of citizenship); Gershon M. Ratner, A New Legal Duty for Urban Public Schools: Effective
Education in Basic Skills, 63 TEX. L. REV. 777, 812–13 (1985) (arguing for a minimally adequate
education); Note, A Right to Learn?: Improving Educational Outcomes Through Substantive Due
Process, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1323, 1324 (2007) (arguing for recognition of basic education as a
constitutional right); Susan H. Bitensky, Theoretical Foundations for a Right to Education Under the
U.S. Constitution: A Beginning to the End of the National Education Crisis, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 550, 579–
96 (1992) (analyzing the right to education via substantive due process).

1036

116:1031 (2022)

Freedom, Democracy, and the Right to Education

Fourteenth Amendment,25 missing the crucial role that the Thirteenth
Amendment and Guarantee Clause played in forcing a system of public
education into existence in the South. History, quite simply, demonstrates
that the right to education involves interests too diverse for the Fourteenth
Amendment to explain alone.26
The historical backdrop of slavery and Reconstruction cures this
problem by revealing, as a matter of fact, the multifaceted interests
implicated by the right to education and at least three constitutional
provisions that protect those interests. The interests include the vestiges of
slavery, parental control and upbringing of children, mental liberty,
citizenship, equality, democratic participation, and republican government.27
Those interests find direct protection in the history and text of the Thirteenth
Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and Guarantee Clause. Understood
this way, education is an individual right that also constitutes the substrata
of the Constitution, unifying and connecting multiple branches, themes, and
powers.
Important caveats, however, are in order. First, while ongoing litigation
makes this Article’s thesis timely, the Article’s primary goal is not to affect
litigation. Accounting for and working through current doctrinal inclinations
and openings can too easily lead to reverse engineering a scholarly argument.
Even then, the applied prospects of scholarship can be dim. This Article’s
primary goal is to understand the federal constitutional right to education as
it was, not as it might be to win litigation contests today. That historic pursuit,
I believe, is of intrinsic value and can help shape how society thinks about,
enforces, and protects the right to education, regardless of what a court might
do with the right in the short term.28 To be sure, this Article will consider
25 See sources cited supra note 24; see also San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,
30 (1973) (examining the right to education exclusively under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment); Gary B. v. Whitmer, 957 F.3d 616, 642 (6th Cir. 2020) (same), reh’g en banc
granted, opinion vacated, 958 F.3d 1216 (6th Cir.). But see Brence D. Pernell, The Thirteenth Amendment
and Equal Educational Opportunity, 39 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 420, 420–21 (2021) (drawing on the
Thirteenth Amendment as a tool for challenging racial inequalities in school discipline).
26 This Article does not adopt the penumbra approach that led to the initial recognition of the right
of privacy in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965), but notes the overlap with its approach.
This Article argues the right to education was contemporaneously linked to specific constitutional
provisions.
27 See, e.g., Gary B., 957 F.3d at 650 (discussing deprivation of education as a weapon during
slavery); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925) (discussing parental liberty over
upbringing of children); Bd. of Educ. v. Pico ex rel. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867–68 (1982) (explaining
individuals’ interests in citizenship, democratic participation, and republican government); Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (asserting that the right to mental liberty is fundamental).
28 This thinking is in the vein of Professor Larry Kramer’s notion that “the role of the people is not
confined to occasional acts of constitution making, but includes active and ongoing control over the

1037

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

modern implications, but fully resolving them with the care they deserve is
beyond its scope. Those issues are matters for another article. For now, this
Article will aim to dislodge some foundational premises about the right and
replace them with rich history.
Second is a matter that perpetually occurs with education rights articles.
This Article examines the existence and source of a right to education. It does
not take up the substance or definition of that right—at least not in the typical
terms of adequacy, equity, or quality. The substance is arguably far more
difficult to triangulate than the existence. That difficulty motivates some
courts to stay out of this area altogether.29 But as the existence remains
uncertain, if not derided, this Article trains its focus on the existence of the
right. On the question of substance, my prior work addresses what the right
to education would have encompassed during the second half of the
nineteenth century.30
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I demonstrates that education,
as a historical matter, is a necessary component of freedom and citizenship,
which the government sought to guarantee in the immediate aftermath of
slavery. It begins by detailing the full breadth of the South’s education
restrictions, which extended well beyond prohibiting Black literacy and
sought to wall off the South from outside ideals. Those restrictions are the
background for understanding many enslaved people’s extraordinary efforts
to become educated and how those secret educational efforts dramatically
expanded when they reached safety behind Union lines. Following the War,
education shifted from the pathway to freedom to an organized movement to
secure the predicates and manifestations of actual freedom: economic liberty,
self-autonomy, citizenship, and self-government. Part I closes by detailing
the governmental responses to the freedmen’s educational needs and
demands. Those responses included presidential and executive action,
congressional action, and state constitutional conventions.
Part II filters these events through subsequent Supreme Court case law
to demonstrate that the U.S. Constitution protects a negative right to
education. As early as 1923, for instance, the Court recognized education as

interpretation and enforcement of constitutional law.” Larry D. Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, Circa
2004, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 959, 959 (2004).
29 See, e.g., Comm. for Educ. Rts. v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1191–93 (Ill. 1996) (“We conclude
that the question of whether the educational institutions and services in Illinois are ‘high quality’ is outside
the sphere of the judicial function.”); Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 41–43 (suggesting that the judiciary should
refrain from creating precedent which would impede states’ abilities to address ongoing, evolving issues
in education).
30 Black, supra note 22, at 744–46; Derek W. Black, The Fundamental Right to Education, 94 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1059, 1085–90 (2019).
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an aspect of parental and liberty rights.31 Filtered through that precedent,
slavery impinged multiple educational interests that the Fourteenth
Amendment now protects. This analysis demonstrates three key points:
(1) negative education rights are well established, (2) slavery imposed the
gravest invasions of those rights, and (3) the Fourteenth Amendment was
designed to provide and authorize remedies to those invasions. These
negative rights to education, however, were insufficient, in and of
themselves, to cure the educational deprivations of slavery.
Part III demonstrates that Congress responded to that insufficiency and
implemented education as a positive right during Reconstruction pursuant to
its authority under multiple constitutional provisions. The three most
relevant constitutional provisions are the Thirteenth Amendment, Fourteenth
Amendment, and Guarantee Clause.32 Part III examines constitutional text,
judicial interpretation, and congressional action to identify the specific and
unique interests that each constitutional provision protects. It also explains
how each provision builds upon the one that preceded it to expand the right
to education.
I.

THE CENTRAL ROLE OF EDUCATION IN SLAVERY,
FREEDOM, AND CITIZENSHIP

Courts and legal scholars have yet to fully evaluate the purpose and
effect of the criminalization of African-American education during slavery,33
typically just noting it as a passing example to support some larger point.34
In 2020, the Sixth Circuit went further than any other court,35 using the
31 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (“His right thus to teach and the right of parents to
engage him so to instruct their children, we think, are within the liberty of the Amendment.”).
32 The transition, as I term it, was more a transition in form than in practice. States’ constitutional
texts transitioned and reflected a new theory of states’ role in delivering education. The practical reality
was slower to come. For instance, the actual enforcement of state constitutional text as an affirmative
right did not occur for another century. For an account of the state judiciaries’ recognition of the transition
to a positive education right, see Joshua E. Weishart, Equal Liberty in Proportion, 59 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 215, 235–40 (2017).
33 See, e.g., Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 219–20 (2009) (noting literacy
prohibitions for enslaved people); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 311 (1966) (explaining
that African-American illiteracy rates served as the rationale for literacy requirements to voter
registration); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 388 (1978) (noting the prohibition on
slave literacy in passing); Lynch v. Alabama, No. CV 08-S-450-NE, 2011 WL 13186739, at *153 (N.D.
Ala. Nov. 7, 2011) (discussing literacy prohibitions).
34
See, e.g., Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 311, 311 n.10 (noting the intersection of prohibitions on literacy
and voting restrictions); Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 219–20 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part) (same).
35 Gary B. v. Whitmer, 957 F.3d 616, 655 (6th Cir. 2020) (holding that “access to such a basic
minimum education is a fundamental right protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
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criminalization of African-American education to help justify a fundamental
right to literacy.36 The court, however, still oversimplified the pre-Civil War
criminalization and post-Civil War discrimination.37 It framed the right to
education as a modern concept to correct past wrongs, rather than a right that
long ago existed—even if never fully implemented.38 A deeper examination
of the criminalization of African-American education reveals that education
lies at the center not just of political power39 but of freedom and liberty—
two other crucial constitutional concepts.
A. African-Americans’ Struggle for Education
The following Sections discuss how African-Americans struggled to
obtain education during slavery, immediately sought it out upon freedom,
and understood it as a gateway to freedom, citizenship, and self-government.
The first Section explains why the South criminalized African-American
literacy. Those prohibitions, however, did not end literacy; they drove it
underground, where African-Americans went to extraordinary lengths to
pass on literacy in secret. Those who were unable to obtain learning in
secret—along with those who wanted to build on their knowledge—
immediately sought learning opportunities upon escaping slavery. As a
result, schools popped up behind Union lines throughout the South during
the Civil War. While education represented a marker of freedom during
slavery, it also became a gateway to citizenship and self-government
afterward.
1. Criminalization of Education to Reinforce Slavery
The belief that the South’s racial and social hierarchy depended on
suppressing African-American education was a product of history that
evolved over time.40 The criminalization of African-American literacy was
Amendment”), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, 958 F.3d 1216 (6th Cir.). Professor Areto A.
Imoukhuede offers one of the fuller explanations of the connection between education, slavery, and
freedom, though only as a subsection of a much broader analysis. See Areto A. Imoukhuede, Education
Rights and the New Due Process, 47 IND. L. REV. 467, 494 (2014).
36 See Gary B., 957 F.3d at 650–51.
37 See id. (jumping from prohibition on slave literacy straight to post-Civil War violence against
African-American schools and then Jim Crow segregation).
38 See id. at 651–52 (framing history as one of racial discrimination in education that required judicial
intervention, beginning with Brown v. Board of Education).
39 See id. (explaining that “access to literacy was viewed as a prerequisite to the exercise of political
power, with a strong correlation between those who were viewed as equal citizens entitled to selfgovernance and those who were provided access to education by the state”).
40 See PATRICIA A. HERMAN, CTR. FOR STUDY OF READING, SOUTHERN BLACKS: ACCOUNTS OF
LEARNING TO READ BEFORE 1861, at 11–12 (1984) (describing how slaveholders “fear[ed]” that “the
spirit of discontent and insurrection” would disturb the economy and upset the social order unless laws
were passed to prevent Black literacy).
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not an original or inherent feature of American slavery. It was not until the
early- to mid-1800s that anti-literacy laws spread.41 Before then, many slave
owners acquiesced in or supported the literacy of enslaved people.42 Literate
enslaved people’s leading role in planning and executing revolts in 1822 and
1831 crystalized American slavery’s need for more aggressive limits on the
literacy of enslaved people.43 Equally important, the growing circulation of
abolitionist writings stoked fears that subversive written materials would
provoke more unrest.44
Many slave owners had also long understood that slave literacy
increased the risk of escape. Literate enslaved people could coordinate and
plan their own individual escapes45 and share information with others who
might do the same or take even more extreme measures.46 But more
fundamentally, literacy challenged slave owners’ dominion. As Frederick
Douglass’s enslaver proclaimed, “Learning would spoil the best [racial
epithet] in the world” and “forever unfit him to be a slave,”47 explicitly
acknowledging that literacy would disrupt established hierarchies of
violence and control.
The South responded to these concerns with legal restrictions aimed at
more than just the functional skill of literacy.48 The South Carolina

41 Birgit Brander Rasmussen, “Attended with Great Inconveniences”: Slave Literacy and the 1740
South Carolina Negro Act, 125 PROC. MOD. LANGUAGE ASS’N 201, 201–02 (2010) (discussing the South
Carolina anti-literacy law as an innovation in response to a revolt, a measure that became a familiar
response to uprisings in slaveholding territories across different periods).
42 See, e.g., Janet Cornelius, “We Slipped and Learned to Read:” Slave Accounts of the Literacy
Process, 1830-1865, 44 PHYLON 171, 171–72 (1983) (noting that some taught enslaved people to read
for religious purposes); see also HERMAN, supra note 40, at 12–13 (discussing churches that taught
enslaved people).
43 See, e.g., Nicholas May, Holy Rebellion: Religious Assembly Laws in Antebellum South Carolina
and Virginia, 49 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 237, 253 (2007) (noting the growing fear among white South
Carolinians that rebellion would repeat itself as the consequence of literacy through religion); see also
Beaubrun, supra note 13, at 203–09; Kim Tolley, Slavery, in MISEDUCATION: A HISTORY OF IGNORANCEMAKING IN AMERICA AND ABROAD 13, 13–16 (A. J. Angulo ed., 2016) (explaining that the timing of Nat
Turner’s rebellion makes it impossible to foist the full responsibility of these anti-literacy laws on it).
44 See Sean Wilentz, Introduction to DAVID WALKER’S APPEAL: TO THE COLOURED CITIZENS OF
THE WORLD, BUT IN PARTICULAR, AND VERY EXPRESSLY, TO THOSE OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA, at vii–xxiii (1995).
45 Cornelius, supra note 42, at 183 (indicating that five enslaved people in the study had used literacy
to escape); FREDERICK DOUGLASS, NARRATIVE OF THE LIFE OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS, AN AMERICAN
SLAVE 42–43 (Boston, Anti-Slavery Off. 1845) (discussing the use of literacy to escape).
46 See, e.g., Tolley, supra note 43, at 27 (discussing how the law instituted “quarantine on ships
carrying free black sailors” to prevent the free exchange of information between them and enslaved
people).
47 DOUGLASS, supra note 45, at 36. The author and editors have agreed to edit this quote in keeping
with the journal’s values of diversity and inclusion.
48 See Beaubrun, supra note 13, at 204–09.
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legislature, for instance, prohibited “mental instruction” altogether and made
it unlawful for enslaved people to assemble in any way that might be
construed as involving mental instruction.49 Louisiana prohibited the
harboring of written ideas “having a tendency to produce discontent among
the free colored population or insubordination among the slaves,” whether
by white or Black people, and outlawed any materials that might incite
insubordination from enslaved people.50 Mere possession of such materials
was a crime.51 Throughout the South, violators were flogged and imprisoned,
not simply fined.52 In short, the South did more than outlaw Black literacy;
it stamped out any form of thinking or communication that might contest or
undermine the enforced status of African-Americans as slaves. And as a
result, anti-literacy laws shackled many enslaved people’s minds, language,
and interaction with the world.53 As Frederick Douglass explained, illiteracy
had limited his ability to fully process the depravity of slavery.54 Though
instinctually and emotionally rejecting his slave status, illiteracy denied him
the ideas, concepts, and words to logically delegitimize slavery in his mind.55
2. Enslaved People’s Secret Resistance to Education Deprivation
As doggedly as the South denied access to education, many enslaved
people were equally determined to acquire this forbidden learning. Yet, their
efforts are entirely missing from most legal discussions of the right to
education.56 Unearthing many enslaved people’s determination to acquire
education reveals how deeply the right to learn implicates basic human
agency and liberty. As an elusive marker of freedom,57 many enslaved people
pined for education in ways not altogether distinct from the pains of hunger

49 An Act Respecting Slaves, Free Negroes, Mulattoes, and Mestizoes, for Inforcing the More
Punctual Performance of Patrol Duty, and to Impose Certain Restrictions on the Emancipation of Slaves.,
reprinted in ACTS AND RESOLUTIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF SOUTH-CAROLINA,
PASSED IN DECEMBER, 1800, at 3, 38 (Columbia, Daniel & J. J. Faust 1801); WILLIAMS, supra note 11,
at 13.
50 United States v. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. 785, 793 (C.C.D. Ky. 1866).
51 WILLIAMS, supra note 11, at 14.
52 See BRITISH & FOREIGN ANTI-SLAVERY SOC’Y, supra note 13, at 194–96 (surveying statutes and
their punishments).
53 See SPAN, supra note 11, at 43–44.
54 DOUGLASS, supra note 45, at 40.
55 Id. at 40–41.
56 See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) (examining whether
the Constitution explicitly or implicitly protects the right to education, with no discussion of slavery); see
also supra note 24 (listing sources advocating for the recognition of an implicit right to education).
57 See, e.g., BOOKER T. WASHINGTON, UP FROM SLAVERY: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 6–7 (1901)
(describing an enslaved person’s desire to enter white children’s schoolhouse, imagining it to be
“paradise”); Cornelius, supra note 42, at 181 (stating that enslaved people highly valued literacy because
of “their owners’ resistance”).
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or the chills of winter.58 The pursuit of education was a silent battle against
the condition of slavery itself.59 Slaveholders sought to shrink enslaved
people’s innate sense of self-determination and humanity, while enslaved
people sought the opposite.60
Learning to read, regardless of the purpose to which enslaved people
put it, was an enormous act of defiance.61 Numerous African-Americans, if
only to themselves, were proclaiming that they would not fully submit to
slavery and would, instead, seize a piece of mental freedom for themselves.62
Thus, long before freedom, many enslaved people preserved and spread
“secret” learning.63 In some instances, they covertly operated actual schools
inside buildings and, in others, hid in caves, pits, and the dark of the night
while teaching themselves and others.64
This secret learning was likely more prevalent than most white people
of the time would have suspected.65 When the first missionary teachers came
South, they were surprised by how many African-Americans already knew
how to read and write—some quite well.66 They discovered that many
58 Cf. JAMES D. ANDERSON, THE EDUCATION OF BLACKS IN THE SOUTH, 1860–1935, at 5 (1988)
(indicating that freedmen “cried for the spelling-book as bread, and pleaded for teachers as a necessity of
life”); Letter from W. C. Gannett, 1 FREEDMEN’S REC. 91, 91 (1865) (describing the pursuit of learning
as instinctive as “head-shaking, and clearing of the eyes, after emerging from the waters” of slavery);
JOHN W. ALVORD, FIRST SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT ON SCHOOLS AND FINANCES OF FREEDMEN 1
(Washington, Gov’t Printing Off. 1866) [hereinafter ALVORD, FIRST SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT]
(characterizing freedmen’s educational pursuits as “[t]he natural thirst for knowledge common to all
men”).
59 See SPAN, supra note 11, at 43.
60 WILLIAMS, supra note 11, at 7 (indicating literacy “revealed a world beyond bondage” and
freedom to think in ways that “subverted the master-slave relationship”).
61 Cornelius, supra note 42, at 181; WILLIAMS, supra note 11, at 7 (discussing the tension between
Black people and slaveowners over access to education).
62 See WILLIAMS, supra note 11, at 7.
63 Cornelius, supra note 42, at 173 (presenting an empirical study of the secret learning that had
occurred); Letter from Lucy Chase, 1 FREEDMEN’S REC. 96, 96 (1865) (discussing the substantial secret
learning during slavery).
64 See WILLIAMS, supra note 11, at 19–20 (finding some enslaved people, through various ingenious
tactics, taught themselves to read); C. G. WOODSON, THE EDUCATION OF THE NEGRO PRIOR TO 1861, at
128 (2d ed. 1919) (stating that “Julian Troumontaine taught openly in Savannah up to 1829 when such
an act was prohibited by law” and “taught clandestinely thereafter, however, until 1844”); Virgil A. Clift,
Educating the American Negro, in THE AMERICAN NEGRO REFERENCE BOOK 360, 360–64 (John P. Davis
ed., 1966) (surveying the education of Black students during Colonial, Revolutionary, and pre-Civil War
periods); ELIJAH MARRS, LIFE AND HISTORY OF THE REV. ELIJAH P. MARRS 11–12 (Louisville, Bradley
& Gilbert Co. 1885); DOUGLASS, supra note 45, at 43, 50 (explaining Douglass’s process of secretly
learning to write).
65 See Cornelius, supra note 42, at 184–86 (producing statistics and charts regarding reading levels
among enslaved people); WILLIAMS, supra note 11, at 19–21.
66 See GREEN, supra note 11, at 17; Letter from Lucy Chase, supra note 63, at 95–96; JUSTIN
BEHREND, RECONSTRUCTING DEMOCRACY: GRASSROOTS BLACK POLITICS IN THE DEEP SOUTH AFTER
THE CIVIL WAR 61 (2015).
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enslaved people had learned to read before the criminalization of literacy and
then held onto that knowledge and passed it from generation to generation.67
The best measure of this secret learning may be how quickly formerly
enslaved people advanced in the missionary schools. In Norfolk in 1864, for
instance, missionaries reported that nearly 1,000 out of 1,430 formerly
enslaved people were spelling and reading, with a few hundred performing
math calculations.68
3. Immediate Post-Slavery Desires for Education
The deep desire for education held by many African-Americans
transformed into concrete and systematic forms during and following the
Civil War. Their efforts began during the opening months of the War and
quickly accelerated. And once they recognized that education would impact
not just their immediate lives but the future, they also began to press for
structural and legal changes. Their efforts, combined with those of Northern
missionaries and Union officials, laid the foundation for what became a
formal system of public education—a system that continues in the South to
this day.
In May 1861, about a month after the Civil War began, three enslaved
people fled their plantations for Fort Monroe, Virginia.69 Those three
expanded to 800 within two months and nearly doubled that by the next
spring.70 Having found physical freedom at Fort Monroe, literacy became a
more pressing goal for formerly enslaved people.71 In response, Mary Peake
opened the first school for African-Americans in the South in the fall of
1861.72
A few weeks after the formerly enslaved escaped to Fort Monroe, the
Union won the Battle of Port Royal, South Carolina.73 White Southerners
completely fled Port Royal and left a large population of enslaved people
behind. Union forces allowed the formerly enslaved people to run their own

67

Letter from Lucy Chase, supra note 63, at 95–96.
Report of School Committee, 1 FREEDMEN’S REC. 25, 25 (1864).
69 LOUIS S. GERTEIS, FROM CONTRABAND TO FREEDMAN: FEDERAL POLICY TOWARD SOUTHERN
BLACKS 1861–1865, at 12 (1973).
70 Id. at 19.
71 Edward Lillie Pierce, The Contrabands at Fortress Monroe, 8 ATL. MONTHLY 626, 639 (1861)
(Union officer reporting “a very general desire among the contraband to know how to read”).
72 LEWIS C. LOCKWOOD, TWO BLACK TEACHERS DURING THE CIVIL WAR: MARY S. PEAKE: THE
COLORED TEACHER AT FORTRESS MONROE, at ii (William Loren Katz ed., 1969); GERTEIS, supra note
69, at 20.
73 The attack on Port Royal was launched from Fort Monroe. ROBERT ARTHUR, HISTORY OF FORT
MONROE 91 (1930) (indicating that the expedition against South Carolina sailed from Fort Monroe on
October 29, 1861); John V. Quarstein, Battle of Port Royal Sound, MARINERS’ BLOG (Nov. 5, 2020),
https://blog.marinersmuseum.org/2020/11/battle-of-port-royal-sound/ [https://perma.cc/HD2N-R3KY].
68
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society.74 With that freedom, the formerly enslaved people in conjunction
with Northern missionaries quickly started a rudimentary system of schools.
The first school moved into St. Helena Island’s “Brick Church” in 1863.75
The church, however, quickly proved too small for the swelling number of
students, and the community purchased an adjacent lot on which to build a
three-room schoolhouse—the first ever built for African-Americans in the
South.76 By the end of 1862, almost 2,000 children attended school on three
islands, with more than thirty different schools operating on the islands by
1863.77
Similar stories soon unfolded throughout the eastern seaboard and
Mississippi River region.78 Schools often could not be built fast or large
enough to meet the demand.79 By 1864, schools were operating in Virginia,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Florida, Louisiana, Kentucky, Tennessee,
Mississippi, Arkansas, Missouri, and Kansas.80 Enrollment was consistently
overwhelming and included everyone from young children to adults nearing
the end of life.81
74 See generally KEVIN DOUGHERTY, THE PORT ROYAL EXPERIMENT: A CASE STUDY IN
DEVELOPMENT (2014) (detailing life in Port Royal, South Carolina, where federal officials allowed
formerly enslaved people to operate their own free society, making their own labor decisions and forming
their own cultural institutions).
75 Proclamation No. 9567, 82 Fed. Reg. 6167, 6168 (Jan. 12, 2017).
76 A Timeline of Our History, PENN CTR., http://www.penncenter.com/explore-penn-centers-history
[https://perma.cc/P9NV-U9CT]; see also Luana M. Graves Sellars, Penn Center & the Port Royal
Experiment, HILTON HEAD MONTHLY (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.hiltonheadmonthly.com/living/4078penn-center-the-port-royal-experiment [https://perma.cc/26G9-HLZR] (recounting the Penn Center’s
history).
77 ROBERT C. MORRIS, READING, ’RITING, AND RECONSTRUCTION: THE EDUCATION OF FREEDMEN
IN THE SOUTH, 1861–1870, at 7 (1976).
78 See, e.g., Maxine D. Jones, The American Missionary Association and the Beaufort, North
Carolina School Controversy, 1866-67, 48 PHYLON 103, 103 (1987) (describing the opening of a school
in North Carolina); JAMES E. YEATMAN, A REPORT ON THE CONDITION OF THE FREEDMEN OF THE
MISSISSIPPI: PRESENTED TO THE WESTERN SANITARY COMMISSION 11 (Saint Louis, W. Sanitary
Comm’n Rooms 1863) (reporting on new schools erected in Mississippi).
79 See PETER KOLCHIN, FIRST FREEDOM: THE RESPONSES OF ALABAMA’S BLACKS TO
EMANCIPATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 84 (2008) (recounting Major General Wager Swayne’s statement
that “to open a school has been to have it filled”).
80 See AM. MISSIONARY ASS’N, HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN MISSIONARY ASSOCIATION 14–15
(New York, Bible House 1891); see also JOE M. RICHARDSON, CHRISTIAN RECONSTRUCTION: THE
AMERICAN MISSIONARY ASSOCIATION AND SOUTHERN BLACKS, 1861–1890, at 37–40 (1986) (noting
stories from Virginia, Tennessee, Louisiana, South Carolina, Florida, North Carolina, Arkansas,
Missouri, and Mississippi about the African-American desire for education following the Civil War).
81 See AM. MISSIONARY ASS’N, supra note 80, at 13–14 (describing the increase in missionaries and
teachers as a mark of increased enrollment as well as the ages of students ranging from five years old to
the elderly); Letter from Lucy Chase, supra note 63, at 95–96 (noting the school in Richmond had its
hands full with 1,075 pupils, including both adults and children); ALVORD, FIRST SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT,
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The sacrifices many African-Americans made to attend school were
enormous. Many faced violence, the loss of work and housing, and the
crushing weight of abject poverty.82 Some families had to choose between
school supplies and food, or which child would get to wear shoes for the long
walk to school.83 For instance, when one teacher asked her student why he
was not writing on his slate, he responded “that he had sold his pencil for a
piece of bread.”84 Many African-Americans went to these lengths because
education represented a sharp break from slavery. A scholar of the period
explained:
Becoming literate proved to be as much a psychological victory for many
freedpeople as it was an intellectual one. Illiteracy was a vestige of slavery, a
reminder of the blatant denial of one’s rights to self-advancement; it served as
a badge of inferiority and societal impotence. To become literate challenged
this status.85

The schoolhouse became the “fundamental vehicle” by which many Black
students could distance “themselves from their slave past” and “transition to
freedom.”86
Also notable is the fact that some freedmen demanded education for
their children. For instance, in February 1864, a Union officer testified that
a Black soldier insisted that his children be brought from a distant plantation
so that he could “send them to school.”87 When the officer resisted, the father
rebuked his white superior: “I am in your service; I wear military clothes; I
have been in three battles; I was in the assault at Port Hudson; I want those
children; they are my flesh and blood.”88 Freedmen in North Carolina

supra note 58, at 2 (noting the average attendance of African-American schools in the Confederate and
border states nearly equaled that of white schools in the North, with numbers only trending upwards); J.
W. ALVORD, THIRD SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT ON SCHOOLS AND FINANCES OF FREEDMEN 12 (Washington,
Gov’t Printing Off. 1867) (describing how members from four generations within the same family were
all in school together); WALTER LYNWOOD FLEMING, CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
458 (1905) (noting all African-Americans wanted to go to school irrespective of their age and noting their
desire for education).
82 See, e.g., GREEN, supra note 11, at 30 (noting individuals connected with the racially inclusive
public schools in Richmond faced minor acts of violence from white Richmonders); WILLIAMS, supra
note 11, at 142–43 (noting African-American workers were turned away without financial compensation
for their work, as well as noting the poor shape of the wooden cabins in which they slept); WASHINGTON,
supra note 57, at 4 (describing Washington’s early impoverished years with no cooking stove in his poorly
built plantation cabin).
83
WILLIAMS, supra note 11, at 142–43.
84 Id. at 142.
85 SPAN, supra note 11, at 43.
86 GREEN, supra note 11, at 2–3.
87 WILLIAMS, supra note 11, at 70.
88 Id. (emphasis omitted).
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similarly demanded to know what right an official has “to take our boy . . .
from us and from the School and Send them . . . to work . . . without . . .
parent Consint.”89 These men and others, in effect, proclaimed a human right
to educate their children.90
4. The Gateway to Citizenship and Self-Government
The Union victory and the Thirteenth Amendment ended slavery, but
neither granted African-Americans citizenship.91 While debates over whether
and how best to extend citizenship proceeded at the national level,92 many
freedmen quickly seized on the idea that education was an important step
toward the possibility of citizenship.93 Illiteracy could be the basis upon
which to deny African-Americans voting rights.94 But African-Americans
and their supporters believed that by gaining education, they would prepare
themselves for citizenship and the right to vote—maybe even speed those
rights along.95

89

Id.
Cf. ANDERSON, supra note 58, at 9–10 (discussing Black parents “demanding the continuation of
universal schooling” following “officials temporarily clos[ing] all black schools under their
authorization”). At one point, 10,000 African-Americans reportedly petitioned the military governor to
continue the education program in Louisiana. Id.
91 Maria L. Ontiveros, Noncitizen Immigrant Labor and the Thirteenth Amendment: Challenging
Guest Worker Programs, 38 U. TOL. L. REV. 923, 929 (2007); William M. Carter, Jr., Race, Rights, and
the Thirteenth Amendment: Defining the Badges and Incidents of Slavery, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1311,
1323 (2007). Many in Congress, however, believed that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 did extend
citizenship. Rebecca E. Zietlow, Free at Last! Anti-Subordination and the Thirteenth Amendment,
90 B.U. L. REV. 255, 282 (2010).
92 See generally Zietlow, supra note 91, at 271–75 (surveying those advocating for full equality for
formerly enslaved people); GARRETT EPPS, DEMOCRACY REBORN: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND
THE FIGHT FOR EQUAL RIGHTS IN POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA 234–35 (2006) (discussing objections to
the Civil Rights Act of 1866’s Citizenship Clause); Zietlow, supra note 91, at 283 (same).
93 See, e.g., GREEN, supra note 11, at 3–6, 16 (noting that attending school “symbolized [freedmen’s]
free status and entry . . . as citizens in[to] the body politic”); SPAN, supra note 11, at 29, 31 (discussing
education as the means to liberty and citizenship); cf. Letter from W. C. Gannett, supra note 58, at 108
(“[W]e confidently look for the admission of the freedmen to the general rights of citizenship; and we
feel ourselves doubly bound to fit them for the duties of citizenship by educating them.”).
94 See Black, supra note 30, at 1109–10; see also MORRIS, supra note 77, at 219 (discussing the
argument that literacy could be the measure of voter eligibility); WILLIAMS, supra note 11, at 5 (“[E]ach
constituency realized that an educated black population could bring about a seismic change in the
American South.”); Dayna L. Cunningham, Who Are to Be the Electors? A Reflection on the History of
Voter Registration in the United States, 9 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 370, 373–80 (1991) (discussing literacy
restrictions on voting in the post-Reconstruction Era).
95 See, e.g., J. W. ALVORD, EIGHTH SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT ON SCHOOLS FOR FREEDMEN 3 (New
York, AMS Press, Inc. 1869) [hereinafter ALVORD, EIGHTH SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT] (“But with universal
suffrage conceded, surely the freedmen’s vote should be intelligent; as the colored man is to become a
part of society, he must have substantially its privileges . . . .”); Letter from W. C. Gannett, supra note 58,
at 108 (expressing that the purpose of supplying education was “to fit [former slaves] for the duties of
90
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In the few years immediately following the war, well over 100,000
African-Americans took steps to educate themselves through any available
means.96 These efforts typically involved collaborations with missionaries
and the Freedmen’s Bureau97 but also involved African-Americans taking
matters into their own hands. In 1865 in Arkansas, for instance, Black
organizers formed the Freedman’s School Society and raised the funds to
support free schools in Little Rock for the remainder of the year.98 Those
efforts later transitioned into a statewide convention in which Black leaders,
through the Convention of Colored Citizens of the State of Arkansas,
formally demanded that the state “clothe [them] with the power of self
protection” and citizenship through “suffrage” and the “provi[sion] for the
education of [their] children.”99 African-American-led conventions in
Alabama and South Carolina similarly placed education at the forefront of
their visions of citizenship, calling on the state constitutional conventions
and officials to establish “a thorough system of common schools throughout
the State, and indeed of the Union, for the well-being of such ensures to the
advantage of all.”100 The State Convention of the Colored People of South
Carolina even penned a letter to Congress, asking that Congress make
education “as secure in South Carolina as in Massachusetts or Vermont.”101

citizenship”); Robert C. Morris, Introduction to 1 FREEDMEN’S SCHOOLS AND TEXTBOOKS (1980)
(describing that education’s purpose was “to prepare the former slaves for full citizenship”); Letter from
General O. Howard, War Department, Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands,
1 FREEDMEN’S REC. 169, 177 (1865) [hereinafter Letter from General O. Howard] (stating that education
will allow African-Americans to “demand and receive both privileges and rights” that were not yet
guaranteed); MORRIS, supra note 77, at 219–20 (noting that aid societies prepared Black people for “the
rights and responsibilities of full citizenship”); ANDERSON, supra note 58, at 31 (stating that the purpose
for schooling was to provide formerly enslaved people with the literacy skills and “the rudiments of
citizenship training” to participate “in a democratic society”).
96 See ALVORD, FIRST SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 58, at 2 (indicating that 90,589 AfricanAmericans were in school); J. W. ALVORD, NINTH SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT ON SCHOOLS FOR FREEDMEN
4 (Washington, Gov’t Printing Off. 1870) [hereinafter ALVORD, NINTH SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT]
(reporting 122,317 pupils); J. W. ALVORD, FIFTH SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT ON SCHOOLS FOR FREEDMEN 7
(Washington, Gov’t Printing Off. 1868) (estimating that one million African-Americans were ready to be
educated on a regular basis).
97 See supra note 68 and accompanying text; supra note 95.
98 ALVORD, FIRST SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 58, at 11.
99 1 PROCEEDINGS OF THE BLACK NATIONAL CONVENTIONS, 1865–1900, at 194 (Philip S. Foner &
George E. Walker eds., 1986).
100 GREEN, supra note 11, at 49; see also Alabama Colored Convention, 19TH CENTURY U.S.
NEWSPAPERS, https://omeka.coloredconventions.org/items/show/1690 [https://perma.cc/8QPE-CPB7]
(calling for the creation of tax-supported schools); PROCEEDINGS OF THE COLORED PEOPLE’S
CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 9–10 (Charleston, S.C. Leader Off. 1865) (adopting a
rule that calls for the establishment of schools in every neighborhood).
101 PROCEEDINGS OF THE COLORED PEOPLE’S CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA,
supra note 100, at 30.
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B. The Governmental Response: Guaranteeing Access to Education
Both the federal and state governments responded to the freedmen’s
calls with decisive action that sparked an education revolution.102 The actions
that Congress, the federal Executive Branch, and states took to secure
education were not, however, just on behalf of freedmen. They were on
behalf of everyone.103 Poor whites’ access to education, while not prohibited,
had been sparse in the South.104 What began as a remedy to slavery became
an agenda to extend education to all and reclaim the nation’s founding vision
of democracy.105 As one scholar succinctly concluded, “The chief
contribution of the Reconstruction government was to set a precedent for the
democratic right of all people to public tax-supported education.”106 The
following Sections individually detail the executive, legislative, and
constitutional steps in pursuit of this agenda.
1. Executive and Congressional Action During the War
The first most notable executive action occurred in 1863 in Louisiana.
President Lincoln sent General Nathaniel Banks, the commander there, a
letter outlining the next steps for Louisiana.107 Lincoln wrote that the state
needed to “adopt some practical system by which the two races could
gradually live themselves out of their old relation to each other, and both
come out better prepared for the new.”108 This required a state constitutional
convention.109 Lincoln deferred to Louisiana’s people on most aspects of
their new government but was direct on one: “Education for young blacks
should be included in the plan.”110

102 Cf. J. W. ALVORD, SECOND SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT ON SCHOOLS AND FINANCES OF FREEDMEN
13 (Washington, Gov’t Printing Off. 1866) (“We hail, with exceeding pleasure, the better feeling in regard
to the education of these freedmen. All advances on the subject should be cordially met. . . . [I]f the
several States will inaugurate and sustain a system of public instruction for all, though imperfect at first,
we should give it warmest encouragement.”); ALVORD, NINTH SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 96, at
4 (describing how education had produced “a revolution” from “which [the South] can never go
backward”).
103 See Clift, supra note 64, at 366.
104 See generally LAWRENCE A. CREMIN, AMERICAN EDUCATION: THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE
1783–1876, at 148–63 (1980) (contrasting the history of public education in New York and Massachusetts
with that in Virginia); see also CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 1st Sess. 167 (1867) (statement of Sen.
Sumner) (emphasizing illiteracy rates were four times higher in the South).
105 See, e.g., H.R. J., 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 69 (1865) (framing the creation of the Department of
Education as an attempt to reach the nation’s goals of a republican form of government).
106 Clift, supra note 64, at 366.
107 Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Nathaniel Banks (Aug. 5, 1863), in 6 ABRAHAM LINCOLN
ASS’N, THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 365, 365 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id.
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General Banks responded by issuing General Order 23.111 The order
reshaped local government until such time as the people formed a new one.112
Most notably, it divided the state into districts, required them to establish a
system of schools, and placed them under the direction of a superintendent.113
A second order dictated the managerial, operational, and resource details for
the education system.114 The most aggressive detail was to grant the districts
taxing power to support the schools—something that would have been
radical even in the North.115
This type of unilateral wartime executive action transitioned into
congressionally sanctioned activity following the War. Congress’s most
significant role in expanding education was to establish the Freedmen’s
Bureau.116 The Bureau was responsible for “provisions, clothing, and fuel,
as . . . [may be] needful for the immediate and temporary shelter and supply
of destitute and suffering refugees and freedmen and their wives and
children.”117 That basic subsistence work quickly transitioned to ensuring
lasting freedom and citizenship through education. Bureau officials, like the
freedmen, saw education as the gateway to citizenship.
General Oliver Howard, the Bureau Director, wrote that “from the first
I have devoted more attention to [the education of the freedmen] than to any
other branch of my work.”118 His logic was simple: “Education underlies
every hope of success for the freedman. . . . Through education . . . the
fearful prejudice and hostility against the blacks can be overcome. They
themselves will be able to demand and receive both privileges and rights that

111

General Orders, No. 23 (Feb. 3, 1864), in 34 ROBERT N. SCOTT, THE WAR OF THE REBELLION:
A COMPILATION OF THE OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES 227–29
(Washington, Gov’t Printing Off. 1891).
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 See General Orders, No. 38 (Mar. 22, 1864), in 4 ELIHU ROOT, THE WAR OF THE REBELLION: A
COMPILATION OF THE OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES 193–94 (1900),
https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=hvd.hwsk39;view=1up;seq=209 [https://perma.cc/ZVU3-SMKS].
115 Compare id. (permitting the acquisition of land, establishing schools, and authorizing the
employment of teachers), with JOHANN N. NEEM, DEMOCRACY’S SCHOOLS: THE RISE OF PUBLIC
EDUCATION IN AMERICA 69–71 (2017) (discussing reluctance of citizens in New York and Massachusetts
to increase funding allocations to schools). For further discussion of resistance to supporting the
establishment of schools, see ALVORD, EIGHTH SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 95, at 1 (discussing
former slave owners’ objection to school taxes).
116 See Freedmen’s Bureau Act of 1865, ch. 90, 13 Stat. 507; CREMIN, supra note 104, at 517–21
(summarizing the Bureau’s extensive education work); ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S
UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863–1877, at 144 (1988) (“Education probably represented the [Freedmen’s
Bureau’s] greatest success in the postwar South.”).
117 § 2, 13 Stat. at 508.
118 2 OLIVER OTIS HOWARD, AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF OLIVER OTIS HOWARD: MAJOR GENERAL
UNITED STATES ARMY 368 (1907).
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we now have difficulty to guarantee.”119 The Bureau’s expenditures revealed
a commitment beyond rhetoric.120 Education consumed more than two-thirds
of the Bureau’s budget in most years.121 Bureau officers secured, leased, and
helped build and repair facilities for schools.122 They coordinated with
missionaries and local communities to staff those buildings with teachers.123
The Bureau’s education efforts were so expansive that they required
their own leadership and bureaucracy. John Alvord served as General
Superintendent of Schools,124 with a structure of state and local
superintendents underneath him.125 His department helped establish and
maintain 4,239 schools, hire 9,307 teachers, and educate 247,333 students.126
Yet, General Howard recognized that the Bureau’s role, as well as
Congress’s, was temporary.127 The ultimate goal was for states, not the
federal government, to provide education.128 That meant facilitating
education in certain respects and absolutely demanding it of states in others.
Those demands, which the next Section details, established a structure strong
enough to outlive the Bureau.

Letter from General O. Howard, supra note 95, at 177. The solution to our “delicate social
dilemma,” wrote the North Carolina superintendent, was to “[s]end out teachers . . . . in the track of every
conquering army. Let them swarm over the savannahs of the South.” Negro Affairs in North Carolina,
1 FREEDMEN’S REC. 141, 144 (1865).
120 See FONER, supra note 116, at 144.
121 Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amendment,
71 VA. L. REV. 753, 780–81 (1985); see also PAUL SKEELS PEIRCE, THE FREEDMEN’S BUREAU: A
CHAPTER IN THE HISTORY OF RECONSTRUCTION 76–77 (1904) (discussing the multiple ways in which
the funds were raised for and expended on education, including through discretionary acts of the Bureau).
122 See, e.g., MORRIS, supra note 77, at 49 (noting congressional funds for “repairs and rent of
schoolhouses”); GEORGE R. BENTLEY, A HISTORY OF THE FREEDMEN’S BUREAU 171–74 (1955)
(discussing the acquisition of buildings, which were given free of rent for schools, and the creative
financing to support the schools).
123 MORRIS, supra note 77, at 36–37, 43–44, 49 (discussing immediate coordination with
missionaries and later work with major organizations).
124 Id. at 37.
125 Id. at 37–38; see also J. W. ALVORD, FOURTH SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT ON SCHOOLS FOR
FREEDMEN 11–37 (Washington, Gov’t Printing Off. 1868) [hereinafter ALVORD, FOURTH SEMI-ANNUAL
REPORT] (receiving reports from various state superintendents).
126 J. W. ALVORD, TENTH SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT ON SCHOOLS FOR FREEDMEN 4 (Washington,
Gov’t Printing Off. 1870); 2 ALAN BRINKLEY, AMERICAN HISTORY: CONNECTING WITH THE PAST 409
(2014). To be clear, however, African-Americans made huge contributions on their own behalf—both
financially and through in-kind services. ALVORD, FOURTH SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 125, at
3–4 (indicating 28,068 freedmen paid tuition and covered about 40% of the Bureau’s monthly statewide
costs in some instances and the entire cost of some schools).
127 Letter from General O. Howard, supra note 95, at 130 (indicating the Bureau’s role was to act
“until a system of free schools can be supported by the re-organized local governments”).
128 Id.
119

1051

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2. Congress’s Terms for Readmitting Southern States to the Union
Congress specified the conditions for Confederate states’ readmission
to the Union in the Reconstruction Act of 1867.129 They had to rewrite their
constitutions to conform to a republican form of government and the U.S.
Constitution, extend the ballot to African-Americans, and ratify the
Fourteenth Amendment.130 And Congress would determine whether the new
constitutions did, in fact, conform to a republican form of government.131
Congress refrained from defining a republican form of government but made
it clear that it expected states to eliminate slavery’s remnants, ensure voting,
and provide for education.132
The consensus around education was sufficiently broad that the Senate
considered and nearly did something far more radical: prohibit school
segregation (eighty-seven years before Brown v. Board of Education).
Senator Charles Sumner, a longtime opponent of school segregation,133
proposed an amendment to the Reconstruction Act to explicitly require that
states’ public schools be “open to all, without distinction of race or color.”134
As radical as the amendment was, it fell just one vote short of passing.135 Not
a single senator, however, contested the notion that education was a necessity
in a republican form of government. The objections were to integration and
placing explicit advance conditions on readmission, regardless of their
substance.136
Later enacted legislation confirmed that education was a requirement
of republican government. The first seven Confederate states readmitted
under the Reconstruction Act included affirmative education clauses in their

129

Reconstruction Act of 1867, ch. 153, § 5, 14 Stat. 428, 429.
Id.
131 Id.
132 Black, supra note 22, at 775–83.
133 Senator Sumner served as counsel and argued against school segregation in Roberts v. Boston,
59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198 (1850). His loss, unfortunately, became a predicate for the Supreme Court’s
decision in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896).
134 CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 1st Sess. 165, 581 (1867) (statements of Sen. Sumner). Senator
Sumner explained that the amendment was a simple “safeguard for the future” and a natural corollary to
universal suffrage, which Congress already required. Id. at 166–67.
135 Id. at 170 (statement of the President pro tempore).
136 See, e.g., id. at 169–70 (statements of Sens. Williams, Cole & Buckalew) (posing a rhetorical
question regarding whether the amendment would require integration and then voting against it); id. at
148 (statement of Sen. Conkling) (arguing that readmission requirements are akin to “forcing upon an
unwilling people a minority government”); id. at 149 (statement of Sen. Howard) (objecting to the
condition of voting rights); id. at 157 (statement of Sen. Hendricks) (arguing that it was wrong to impose
readmission conditions “at the point of the bayonet”); id. at 168 (indicating a negative vote against
condition of general education because Congress lacks such power).
130
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constitutions.137 But one of those states, Georgia, started breaking certain
commitments immediately after readmission, expelling newly elected
African-Americans from the state legislature.138 To guard against any further
ambiguity or backsliding, Congress was more explicit with the remaining
Confederate states’ readmissions. For example, Congress conditioned their
readmission on education, requiring that the “constitution[s] of [those states]
shall never be so amended or changed as to deprive any citizen or class of
citizens of the United States of the school rights and privileges secured by
the constitution[s] of said State[s].”139
3. Congressional Efforts Beyond the South
Congress also took steps to expand education in other states. Concurrent
with passing the Reconstruction Act, Congress established a federal
Department of Education.140 The stated purpose was twofold: to monitor
whether states were carrying out their education obligations and “aid” in
education’s further expansion “throughout the country.”141 More specifically,
the Department was to work toward the “establishment and maintenance of
efficient school systems.”142 These terms of art, along with “uniform”
systems, were found in various new state constitutional clauses of the era.143
This choice of language and its appearance in state constitutions reveals
that Congress and states were moving in a singular direction toward systems
of education. Slavery, the failures of the past, and the aspirations of the
reframed Union required no less. As Representative Samuel W. Moulton
explained:
[E]very child of this land is, by natural right, entitled to an education at the
hands of somebody, and . . . this ought not to be left to the caprice of individuals
or of States so far as we have any power to regulate it. At least, every child in
the land should receive a sufficient education to qualify him to discharge all the
duties that may devolve upon him as an American citizen. This is as much a
natural right as the right to breath the air.144

137

Black, supra note 22, at 783–90; GLENNA R. SCHROEDER-LEIN & RICHARD ZUCZEK, ANDREW
JOHNSON: A BIOGRAPHICAL COMPANION 240 (2001) (cataloguing readmissions).
138 RICHARD L. HUME & JERRY B. GOUGH, BLACKS, CARPETBAGGERS, AND SCALAWAGS: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS OF RADICAL RECONSTRUCTION 135–36 (2008).
139 Act of Mar. 30, 1870, ch. 39, 16 Stat. 80, 81 (Texas); Act of Feb. 23, 1870, ch. 19, 16 Stat. 67,
68 (Mississippi); Act of Jan. 26, 1870, ch. 10, 16 Stat. 62, 63 (Virginia).
140 An Act to Establish a Department of Education, ch. 158, 14 Stat. 434, 434 (1867).
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Some examples of state constitutions containing either the term of art “efficient” or “uniform”
include: IND. CONST. of 1851, art. VIII, § 1; KAN. CONST. of 1861, art. VI, § 2; NEB. CONST. of 1866,
art. II, § 1; NEV. CONST. of 1864, art. XI, § 2; and W. VA. CONST. of 1863, art. X, § 2.
144 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3045 (1866) (statement of Rep. Moulton).
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4. States’ Constitutional Responses
The state response to Congress’s readmission demands was emphatic.
Before the Reconstruction Act of 1867, a few Southern state constitutions
made reference to education, but they did not mandate the creation of a
statewide education system. Within three years of the Act, all ten remaining
Confederate states had adopted affirmative education clauses in their
constitutions, often quite detailed in structure.145 In most instances, state
constitutional conventions met immediately after Congress passed the
Reconstruction Act.146 The conventions’ stated goal was to create a
republican form of government,147 and they consistently emphasized that
education was a central component of such a government and necessary to
prepare citizens to assume their roles in it.148
Most conventions created a committee devoted exclusively to drafting
a detailed education article for the constitution.149 The final result was robust

145 See ALA. CONST. of 1868, art. XI, § 6; ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 1; FLA. CONST. of 1868,
art. VIII, § 1; GA. CONST. of 1868, art. VI, § 1; LA. CONST. of 1868, tit. VII, art. 135; MISS. CONST. of
1868, art. VIII, § 1; N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 2; S.C. CONST. of 1868, art. X, § 3; TEX. CONST. of
1869, art. IX, § 1; VA. CONST. of 1870, art. VIII.
146 See, e.g., CYNTHIA E. BROWNE, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS: FROM INDEPENDENCE
TO THE COMPLETION OF THE PRESENT UNION, 1776–1959: A BIBLIOGRAPHY 5, 39, 46, 80, 112, 167, 234
(1973) (showing that most state conventions occurred within one year of the passage of the
Reconstruction Act).
147 See, e.g., 1 PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF SOUTH CAROLINA 10
(Charleston, Denny & Perry 1868) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF SOUTH CAROLINA]
(demonstrating framers’ desire to do what was “necessary to secure a Republican form of Government”);
2 id. at 628–807 (stating importance of education in a country where “the republican form of government
prevails”); JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 486–
87 (Raleigh, Joseph W. Holden 1868) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF NORTH CAROLINA]
(urging the “Republican principle of local self-government,” public education, and teaching lessons of
“statesmanship” and participatory government).
148 E.g., CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF SOUTH CAROLINA, supra note 147, at 264 (explaining
that education “is the surest guarantee of the . . . republican liberty”); 2 id. at 688 (stating that education
was necessary for republican progress); id. at 695 (explaining that an ignorant man “can never be a good
citizen”); DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION TO FORM A CONSTITUTION FOR THE STATE
OF ARKANSAS 500 (Little Rock, J. G. Price 1868) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF
ARKANSAS] (arguing that access to education would give Black people the means to “take their place . . .
among the leaders of their people”); id. at 683 (supporting the constitution because of its education
mandate); CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 147, at 486 (providing for
county government to carry out the “Republican principle of local self-government” and education);
OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION, FOR FRAMING A CONSTITUTION FOR THE
STATE OF LOUISIANA 200–01, 289 (New Orleans, J. B. Roudanez & Co. 1868) [hereinafter
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF LOUISIANA] (stating that education was a necessity for AfricanAmericans).
149 See, e.g., Black, supra note 22, at 784–85 (detailing the committee structures in South Carolina);
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF SOUTH CAROLINA, supra note 147, at 264; CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION OF NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 147, at 338; CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF
ARKANSAS, supra note 148, at 61; CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF LOUISIANA, supra note 148, at 13.
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education articles and clauses that mandated statewide uniform systems of
education,150 tax schemes to ensure funding,151 and constitutional officers and
state boards of education to manage and dictate the details of the systems.152
Equally, if not more, important, these new Southern constitutions mandated
that public schools be open to “all” children,153 a phrase effectively mirroring
Senator Sumner’s proposed amendment to the Reconstruction Act two years
earlier.154
This wave of constitutional education mandates became the model for
the rest of the nation. The thirteen new states that entered the Union after
1867 all included an education mandate in their constitutions.155 Congress
denied the petition of the single state, New Mexico, that attempted statehood
without an education clause in its constitution.156 Northern states, during the
normal process of revisions, also began voluntarily including new education
clauses in their constitutions.157 By 1875, the only state without an education
150

See FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, § 2; MISS. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, § 1; N.C. CONST. of
1868, art. IX, § 2; S.C. CONST. of 1868, art. X, § 3; TEX. CONST. of 1869, art. IX, § 4; VA. CONST. of
1870, art. VIII, § 3. During this same period, the term “uniform” also was used outside the South. See,
e.g., NEV. CONST. of 1864, art. XI, § 2 (“The Legislature shall provide for a uniform system of common
schools . . . .”).
151 For examples of states appropriating tax proceeds for educational purposes, see ALA. CONST. of
1868, art. XI, §§ 10, 11; FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, §§ 4, 7; GA. CONST. of 1868, art. VI, § 3; and
see also JOHN MATHIASON MATZEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS FOR EDUCATION:
FUNDAMENTAL ATTITUDE OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE REGARDING EDUCATION AS REVEALED BY STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 1776–1929, at 129–39 (1931) (tracking the new common school funds in
state constitutions).
152 MATZEN, supra note 151, at 4–12, 36–52, 118 (cataloging state constitutional provisions
establishing state boards of education, state superintendents, and common school funds).
153 ALA. CONST. of 1868, art. XI, § 6; ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 1; FLA. CONST. of 1868, art.
IX, § 1; GA. CONST. of 1868, art. VI, § 1; LA. CONST. of 1868, tit. VII, art. 135; N.C. CONST. of 1868,
art. IX, § 2; S.C. CONST. of 1868, art. X, § 4.
154 See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 1st Sess. 166 (1867) (statement of Sen. Sumner).
155 See INST. FOR EDUC. EQUITY & OPPORTUNITY, EDUCATION IN THE 50 STATES: A DESKBOOK OF
THE HISTORY OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS AND LAWS ABOUT EDUCATION app. 1 (2008) (summarizing the
education clauses and their histories in each state).
156
Id. at 29. The denial of admission, however, involved complexities beyond education. Some
apparently opposed New Mexico’s admission due to fears of rebalancing sectional partisan power in
Congress from the east to the west. See DAVID V. HOLTBY, FORTY-SEVENTH STAR 39–48 (2012). That
aside, the Senate had serious concerns about New Mexico’s “success [on] three key agents of
Americanization—public schools, courts, and public officials.” Id. at 53.
157 See William Penn Sch. Dist. v. Pa. Dep’t of Educ., 170 A.3d 414, 423 (Pa. 2017) (noting the 1873
Pennsylvania convention corrected the prior education clause, which was limited to a system of pauper
schools, and that Massachusetts, Connecticut, Ohio, and Michigan also added education clauses to their
constitutions to provide universal public education); see also 7 DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION TO AMEND
THE CONSTITUTION OF PENNSYLVANIA 691–92 (Harrisburg, Benjamin Singerly 1873) [hereinafter
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF PENNSYLVANIA] (“If there is any duty more incumbent upon the
whole people of this Commonwealth than any other, it is to see that every child . . . shall be educated and
taken care of.”); PA. CONST. of 1874, art. X, § 1 (providing for public education).
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clause was Connecticut (though Connecticut’s constitution did reserve
certain funds for education).158 In short, after 1867, Congress never admitted
another state to the Union without an education clause—and those few
existing states without an education clause soon revised their constitutions
to correct the omission.159
II. ALIGNING HISTORY AND PRECEDENT WITH THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION
African-Americans’ education efforts before and after slavery provide
an illuminating framework through which to view the right to education. The
educational deprivations they suffered were, of course, never adjudicated.
But the Supreme Court later recognized rights, such as those of parents to
control the education and upbringing of their children, that implicate those
deprivations. The Court’s other broader liberty doctrines also reveal that
more is at stake with education than just parental rights. In short, a
retrospective accounting of enslaved people’s experiences demonstrates that
their education deprivations were denials of humanity and liberty. And
correcting these denials became a key predicate for the nation to transition
education from a negative right to an affirmative one.
The following Sections lay out that predicate. Section II.A details the
Supreme Court’s precedent regarding the negative right to education,
including parental rights and the broader individual mental and physical
liberty rights intertwined with education. Section II.B then filters enslaved
people’s experiences through that precedent and explains how, even with the
fall of slavery, their negative liberty rights could not be realized without the
affirmative provision of education.
A. Negative Education Rights
This Section analyzes Supreme Court precedent and rationales
regarding parental rights over education and other rights deeply tied to the
right to education. Those rights are primarily understood as negative rights
that prohibit interference with education. Their underlying logic, however,
is consistent with an affirmative right to education. More specifically, a
negative right to education is insufficient to protect the constitutional liberty
rights at stake in these cases.

158 Steven G. Calabresi & Michael W. Perl, Originalism and Brown v. Board of Education,
2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 429, 457–59 & n.130. Connecticut cured that defect in 1965. Id. at 458 n.130.
159 See id. at 458 n.132.
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1. Parental Control over Education
Scholars have paid relatively scant attention to the fact that some
fundamental negative education rights already exist.160 Those rights, while
short of the affirmative type of right advocates seek, buttress the logic to an
affirmative right to education.161 The first relevant case, decided in 1923, was
Meyer v. Nebraska.162 In Meyer, the Court struck down a statute that
interfered with children’s ability to learn German.163 The Court explained
that “[t]he American people have always regarded education and acquisition
of knowledge as matters of supreme importance” and “it is the natural duty
of the parent to give his children education suitable to their station in life.”164
The Court then, without any doctrinal explanation, announced that state
interference with parental education efforts for their children implicated
“fundamental rights which must be respected.”165 The Court had yet to
formalize its strict scrutiny framework166 but indicated that the state lacked a
sufficient justification to interfere with the parental right.167
Two years later in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the Court framed Meyer
as recognizing a Fourteenth Amendment “liberty of parents and guardians to
direct the upbringing and education of children under their control.”168
Relying on that right, the Court declared the requirement that all children
attend public school unconstitutional because it interfered with parents’
ability to send their children to private schools.169 The Court wrote that “[t]he
fundamental theory of liberty” in our Constitution “excludes any general
power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept
instruction from public teachers only.”170 Parents “who nurture” and “direct
[their children’s] destiny have the right . . . to recognize and prepare [them]

160 See, e.g., Biegel, supra note 24, at 1083 (noting these negative rights only in passing); Ratner,
supra note 24 (failing to discuss negative rights cases). But see Bitensky, supra note 24, at 580–81
(discussing the negative right to education in the context of substantive due process analysis of education);
Joshua E. Weishart, Reconstituting the Right to Education, 67 ALA. L. REV. 915, 961–62, 975 (2016)
(accounting for negative education rights in analyzing theories of positive education rights).
161 See Bitensky, supra note 24, at 583 (explaining the logic by which Meyer v. Nebraska, Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, and personhood cases require government to provide education).
162 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
163 Id. at 396–97.
164 Id. at 400.
165 Id. at 401.
166 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
167 Meyer, 262 U.S. at 403.
168 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925); see also Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404, 409 (1923) (overturning
the conviction of a teacher for instructing students in German because the conviction was inconsistent
with Meyer).
169 Id.
170 Id. at 535.
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for additional obligations.”171 The Court has since reaffirmed these rights on
several occasions,172 rendering a fundamental parental right in regard to
education beyond question.
2. Liberty Rights Involved in Education
The parental right to direct their children’s education, however, only
skims the surface of the negative right to education. Various other individual
rights bear upon and undergird education. First among these is the basic right
to mental liberty,173 one of the most foundational rights in the Constitution.174
Mental liberty includes more particularized rights, including freedom of
conscience or belief, freedom of thought, freedom of inquiry, and freedom
of religion.175 Mental liberty also intersects with tangible rights to act, such
as the rights to receive information, disseminate information, and make
certain personal life choices.176 While principally grounded in the First
Amendment, these freedoms are not confined to the First Amendment but
are grounded in liberty itself.177 “Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds.
Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought,
belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct.”178
Mental freedom also includes the inverse right to be free from
government-imposed ideology. The Court famously wrote in West Virginia
State Board of Education v. Barnette that

171

Id.
See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207, 218 (1972) (affirming right of Amish parents
not to enroll children in any private or public school); Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, 298 (1927)
(rejecting affirmative direction of foreign-language schools partly based on idea that such direction
deprives parents of right to “direct the education of [their] own children”).
173 See Bitensky, supra note 24, at 582–83 (stating that “it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that
intellectual development is a major component of human identity” and thus the right of privacy).
174 See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 51–52 (1985) (describing the “sphere of intellect and
spirit” as “reserve[d] from all official control” by the First Amendment (citing Wooley v. Maynard,
430 U.S. 705, 714–15 (1977))); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (“If
there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe
what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion . . . .”).
175 See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 51–52 (analyzing issue from several distinct yet related First
Amendment rights (citing Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714)). Freedom of conscience, of course, overlaps with
religious freedom and belief. See, e.g., Emp. Div., Dep’t of Hum. Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990)
(articulating that the First Amendment excludes any regulations on religious beliefs per se).
176 See, e.g., Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714 (referencing and connecting various rights to “the broader
concept of ‘individual freedom of mind’” (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637)); Planned Parenthood of
Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 915–17 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(referencing choice, information, liberty, and dignity).
177 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003); Wallace, 472 U.S. at 49 (discussing the
intersection between the First and Fourteenth Amendments); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303
(1940) (stating that “[t]he fundamental concept of liberty” includes First Amendment rights).
178 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562.
172
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[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official,
high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism,
religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act
their faith therein. If there are any circumstances which permit an exception,
they do not now occur to us.179

The freedom to explore ideas, whether in the classroom, library, home, or
open marketplace of ideas, must be free of totalitarianism or “orthodoxy.”180
These rights further translate into affirmative rights to engage others in
thought. “[P]ublic access to discussion, debate, and the dissemination of
information and ideas”181 is necessary to prevent the government from
“strangl[ing] the free mind at its source”182 or “contract[ing] the spectrum of
available knowledge.”183 The Court succinctly characterizes this as the
fundamental right to “receive information and ideas.”184 On these grounds,
the Court has struck down government policies that limit access to books,185
interfere with doctor–patient discussions,186 curtail labor-union
recruitment,187 impede particular types of instruction,188 and restrict freedom
of the press.189 The right to receive information also intersects with the
“privacy of a person’s own home—[where the] right takes on an added
dimension.”190 In that context, free access to and use of information is part of
the “the right to be let alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right
most valued by civilized man.”191
These rights have long been treated as the lifeblood of democracy itself.
They “make[] it possible for citizens generally to exercise their rights of free
speech and press in a meaningful manner,”192 acquire and contest ideas, and
179

319 U.S. at 642.
Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of the State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967); Barnette,
319 U.S. at 637.
181 First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978).
182 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637.
183 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965).
184 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762–63
(1972); see also Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943) (stating that the freedom of speech
“embraces the right to distribute literature and necessarily protects the right to receive it” (citation
omitted)).
185 Bd. of Educ. v. Pico ex rel. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 866–67 (1982).
186 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482.
187 Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 534 (1945).
188 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923); Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, 298
(1927).
189 Martin, 319 U.S. at 143 (noting that freedom of speech and press includes the right to receive
information).
190 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564–65 (1969).
191 Id. (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
192 Bd. of Educ. v. Pico ex rel. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867–68 (1982).
180
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participate in the democratic process.193 Without the liberty “to inquire, to
study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding[,] . . . our
civilization will stagnate and die.”194
These varied rights have quite frequently coalesced around and
intersected with education rights. The Court’s lead opinion in Griswold v.
Connecticut, a reproductive-autonomy case, cited the parental education
rights cases as a fountainhead of the right to privacy.195 Summarizing Pierce
v. Society of Sisters and Meyer v. Nebraska, the Court in Griswold
“reaffirmed” the rights to receive information, read, inquire, and think
because those rights overlapped with the reproductive autonomy at issue in
Griswold.196 The Court in Moore v. City of East Cleveland similarly pointed
out that a “host of cases, tracing their lineage” to Meyer and Pierce, “have
consistently acknowledged a ‘private realm of family life which the state
cannot enter.’”197 On that basis, Moore struck down a housing regulation that
limited the number of extended family members who could cohabitate.198
These privacy cases should likewise reflexively impact the logic of the
right to education. While squarely addressing familial and sexual choices,
the Court’s privacy cases explicitly acknowledge that the underlying core
interests at stake are individual dignity and self-autonomy.199 These matters
lie “[a]t the heart of liberty [and] the right to define one’s own concept of
existence.” 200 As demonstrated in Part I, education, in the various ways one
receives and utilizes it, also implicates the basic liberty of choice, selfautonomy, and dignity. That connection suggests the right to education lies
far closer to individual liberty and the proper functioning of our
constitutional system than typically acknowledged. Education is so
intertwined with self-autonomy and liberty that it is more akin to due process
193

See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 954–57 (4th ed.

2011).
194

Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).
381 U.S. 479, 482–83 (1965).
196 Id.
197 Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (plurality opinion) (citations omitted)
(quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
198 Id. at 495–99.
199 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 663 (2015) (“[T]hese liberties extend to certain personal
choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices that define personal
identity and beliefs.”); id. at 665 (“[T]he right to personal choice regarding marriage is inherent in the
concept of individual autonomy.”); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)
(stating that “choices central to personal dignity and autonomy” are “central” to Fourteenth Amendment
liberty); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003) (“Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that
includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct.”).
200 Casey, 505 U.S. at 851; see also Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 665 (describing the “abiding connection
between marriage and liberty”); Cruzan v. Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269, 278–79, 287 (1990)
(describing the connection between medical treatment, bodily autonomy, and personal liberty).
195
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rights that impose positive obligations on the state—such as providing an
attorney, a jury, or a transcript—than it is to a purely positive right to food
or water. The Court, of course, used this latter comparison to discredit the
possibility of a right to a quality education.201 A purely negative right in
education is insufficient to protect liberty. Meaningful liberty, as detailed
below, requires affirmative governmental steps.
B. Slavery’s Infringement on Liberty Through the Denial of Education
The criminalization of African-American education involved a broader
set of goals and activities than just barring enslaved people from the
functional skills of reading and writing.202 The regime restricted information
and ideas to pose a pall of orthodoxy that effectively eliminated the selfautonomy and liberty of enslaved people—and whites. The human agency
that rebelled against that regime reveals the extent to which education is
intertwined with the innate human desire for freedom, liberty, and selfdetermination.203 Framed in these terms, education and literacy fall squarely
within the constitutional right of liberty.
Prohibiting slave literacy served the larger agenda to restrict
information and ideas. In fact, some states directly attacked the ideas and
information themselves and did not limit that attack by race. Louisiana, for
instance, prohibited the circulation of ideas—and mere possession of
materials—that ran counter to the institution of slavery.204 Similarly, South
Carolina seized abolitionist writings from post offices and burned them.205
The South also banned antislavery opinions, criminalizing the presence of
antislavery thinkers and silencing the mere discussion of antislavery ideas.206
Citizens were beaten, banished from town, and jailed for uttering ideas or
201

See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 21–24 (1973) (distinguishing
education infringements from infringements on the rights of criminal defendants); id. at 37 (arguing that
it is difficult to distinguish access to education from access to food and shelter).
202 See supra notes 48–50.
203 See supra Sections I.A.2, I.A.4.
204 United States v. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. 785, 793 (C.C.D. Ky. 1866) (discussing the Louisiana law);
WILLIAMS, supra note 11, at 14–15; see also JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A
HISTORY OF NEGRO AMERICANS 263 (3d ed. 1969) (describing a $20,000 bounty on abolitionist Arthur
Tappan in New Orleans).
205 See FRANKLIN, supra note 204, at 263–64.
206 See, e.g., id. at 263 (discussing bounties on abolitionists); 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AFRICAN
AMERICAN SOCIETY 864–65 (2005) (explaining the Southern response to the publication of David
Walker’s pamphlets, including banning its publication and criminalizing its distribution); William
Lawless Jones, Mob Violence Against Abolitionists in the South, 7 NEGRO HIST. BULL. 134, 136–38
(1944) (surveying acts of violence and punishment, including tarring and feathering a man for allegedly
“talking to a Negro”). In 1836, members of Congress “prevented the reading and circulation of all
antislavery petitions and memorials that were received by Congress.” 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
EMANCIPATION AND ABOLITION IN THE TRANSATLANTIC WORLD 241 (Junius Rodriguez ed., 2007).
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taking actions that might be interpreted as sympathizing with abolition or
equality.207
By restricting access to ideas, access to information, the right to speak,
and the right to think, the South created an intellectually closed community
where the only acceptable ideas were those that expressed full fidelity to
slavery.208 This pall of orthodoxy, combined with anti-literacy laws, seriously
constricted mental self-autonomy. At some point, the denial of education and
ideas is so encompassing that free and voluntary choices cease to exist. The
denial can, in effect, put an individual’s mind in a box. Frederick Douglass,
for instance, explained how he emotionally rebelled against his conditions in
slavery, but also how illiteracy denied him the knowledge and tools to
contest its ideology.209 Slavery had illegitimately propped itself up in his
mind.210 James Pennington similarly recounted how slavery “robbed” him of
education and “shackled” his mind, an “evil” that took him years to “throw[]
off.”211 Other slave narratives similarly convey this larger connection
between education and fundamental mental liberty.212
Many enslaved people’s instinct and desire to learn immediately upon
freedom also confirms education’s role in human dignity and defining life
for oneself. Both before and after the fall of slavery, many AfricanAmericans traveled long distances, sacrificed life’s basic necessities,
devoted every free moment, and even risked violence and punishment to
learn.213 These efforts were acts to claim the liberty and freedom that they
had long been denied.214 They were, as one of the original missionary
teachers wrote, the “first act on coming to the surface, a kind of instinctive
head-shaking, and clearing of the eyes, after emerging from the waters.”215

207

See FRANKLIN, supra note 204, at 264.
See generally Jones, supra note 206, at 136–38 (exploring the violent ways in which the South
sought to repress antislavery thinking against abolitionists and abolitionist sympathizers).
209 See DOUGLASS, supra note 45, at 33 (explaining that the denial of literacy and the keeping of
ideas from him was “the white man’s power to enslave the black man”); see also id. at 39–40 (explaining
that literacy “enabled me to utter my thoughts, and to meet the arguments brought forward to sustain
slavery”).
210 See id. at 40 (explaining that it was impossible to dispel the “everlasting thinking of my condition
that tormented me”).
211 See ARNA BONTEMPS, GREAT SLAVE NARRATIVES 246 (1969).
212 See Lindon Barrett, African-American Slave Narratives: Literacy, the Body, Authority, 7 AM.
LITERARY HIST. 415, 415 (1995) (reviewing and analyzing multiple slave narratives to “consider[] [an]
inexorable connection between literacy and African-American corporeality”).
213 Supra notes 82–85.
214 WILLIAMS, supra note 11, at 30–41.
215 Letter from W. C. Gannett, supra note 58, at 91.
208
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In doing so, many African-Americans exercised a basic instinct to learn and
reclaim a part of their humanity in a way rarely seen in human history.216
These restrictions on education and information, filtered through
modern precedent, amount to an extensive and obvious list of constitutional
rights infringements. At the very least, the prohibition on writing denied
enslaved people the rights to (1) share information with others, (2) free
speech, and (3) free press. The prohibition on reading denied enslaved people
the rights to (1) receive information, (2) access the press, (3) exercise religion
by reading religious texts, and (4) adopt and hold religious beliefs free of the
versions imposed by white intermediaries. The combined prohibition of
reading and writing also denied parents the right to control and direct the
upbringing and education of their children. The prohibition on the circulation
of certain ideas and texts denied enslaved people and whites the right to
engage with, and thus adopt, ideas. The prohibition on reading and writing
denied enslaved people the information and ability to travel beyond their
immediate vicinity.217
In these respects, education was the gateway to what the Court today
recognizes as a hub of interlocking constitutional liberties.218 As such, the
case for education as a fundamental right is far stronger than otherwise
appreciated. If the right to receive information, for instance, is
constitutionally protected because it is a predicate to free speech,219 and the
general right of privacy is a predicate to the rights to procreate, to marry, and
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures,220 education should be
protected as a predicate to the panoply of connected constitutional liberties
and choices that rest upon it. As the lived reality for enslaved people
demonstrated, liberty and self-autonomy do not exist without some level of
education and information. As state constitutions themselves explicitly

216 See What Shall We Do with the Freedmen, Now that They Have No Masters to Take Care of
Them?, 1 FREEDMEN’S REC. 108, 109 (1865) (remarking on the never-before-seen efforts “of a degraded
and subjugated race so anxious for mental culture”); see also The Free Colored People, 1 FREEDMEN’S
REC. 154, 156 (1865) (noting that “it may be doubted whether any other oppressed class . . . has ever
exhibited such ability in withstanding” their circumstances).
217 See, e.g., DOUGLASS, supra note 45, at 86–87 (describing practice of forging notes to facilitate
escape).
218 See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (plurality opinion) (drawing
a line of seemingly disparate cases together as one); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 51–53 (1985)
(articulating freedom of conscience as unifying various rights).
219 Bd. of Educ. v. Pico ex rel. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982).
220 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (explaining penumbral rights
stemming from the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights).
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attested, the provision of public education “is necessary for the preservation
of [the people’s] rights and liberties.”221
III. CONSTITUTIONAL SOURCES FOR THE TRANSITION TO AN
AFFIRMATIVE RIGHT TO EDUCATION
The open and most consequential constitutional issue today is not
whether the Constitution protects a negative right to education—it surely
does—or whether Congress has the authority to protect that right—it surely
does.222 The question is whether the Constitution protects any individual right
of education beyond those negative rights. More specifically, does the
Thirteenth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, Guarantee Clause, or some
other constitutional principle require states to provide some baseline of
educational opportunity? Historical experience, judicial precedent, and
congressional action demonstrate that the answer to this question is yes.
Reaching this conclusion, however, requires a more holistic and
integrated analysis than courts or scholars have previously offered.223 The
Court’s negative and positive education analyses are riddled with
ambiguities that are largely intractable when viewed in isolation.224 But
analyzed together, the Court’s distinct lines of doctrine become
complementary and resolve certain ambiguities. Yet, existing doctrine alone
is insufficient. The Court’s analysis operates at a high level of generality,
rhetoric, and theory that has never systematically broached the constitutional
and historical basis for a right to education.225
The following Sections integrate the Court’s precedent with a detailed
historical accounting of the interplay between access to education and the
221 MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 5, § 2; see also N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. LXXXIII (“Knowledge and
learning, generally diffused through a community, . . . [is] essential to the preservation of a free
government . . . .”); John C. Eastman, When Did Education Become a Civil Right? An Assessment of State
Constitutional Provisions for Education: 1776-1900, 42 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 10–11 (1998) (surveying
state constitution language).
222 See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 396–97 (1923).
223 Most analyze the right to education through only one constitutional doctrine. See, e.g., Friedman
& Solow, supra note 24, at 110 (articulating a substantive due process analysis); Biegel, supra note 24,
at 1081–82 (providing an equal protection or equal opportunity analysis); Liu, supra note 24, at 335
(analyzing under the Citizenship Clause).
224 See, e.g., Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schs., 487 U.S. 450, 466 n.1 (1988) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (writing that the Court did not address the possible right to “minimally adequate education”);
Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 284 (1986) (writing that San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez did not “foreclose the possibility that some identifiable quantum of education is a
constitutionally protected prerequisite” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,
221–22 (1982) (writing that education may not be a fundamental right but “has a fundamental role in
maintaining the fabric of our society” and individual merit).
225 See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (not mentioning slavery
or Reconstruction); Plyler, 457 U.S at 221 (offering no clear doctrinal basis for outcome).
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enactment and implementation of constitutional amendments. Section III.B
analyzes the Thirteenth Amendment, which abolished slavery and gave
Congress the power to abolish slavery’s badges and incidents, including the
lingering effects of forced illiteracy. Section III.C examines how the
Fourteenth Amendment secured liberty and citizenship rights broader than
freedom from slavery—for both white and Black Americans. This broader
guarantee of rights encompassed access to education, which both Congress
and states were contemporaneously extending. Section III.D then grounds
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments in the historical development of
the Constitution’s guarantee of a republican form of government, exploring
states’ initial failures and Congress’s Reconstruction Era corrections.
A. The Positive Rights Implications of the Court’s Negative Rights Cases
An affirmative right to education lies just beneath the surface of the
Court’s negative rights cases. Parents’ right to control their children’s
education, for instance, is logically derivative of the child’s right to
education. Thus, it is no surprise that the Court in Meyer v. Nebraska and
Pierce v. Society of Sisters indicated that parents have a “high” and “natural”
duty to educate their children.226 This notion of a parental duty to educate has
important historical roots. During the second half of the 1800s, some states
contemplated imposing this duty on families through specific constitutional
provisions.227 They ultimately refrained from this not because they
questioned the duty, but because they believed legislatures were better suited
than constitutional conventions to work through the duty’s details.228
Legislatures, of course, did not hesitate in codifying this duty,229
criminalizing the failure to educate one’s child and later articulating it as a
form of abuse and neglect.230 As such, parents’ educational duties warranted
Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400; Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
See, e.g., 6 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 157, at 75–78
(expressing idea that “it is the duty of the parent . . . not only to afford, [b]ut to compel the attendance of
his children to acquire those attainments”); 2 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF SOUTH CAROLINA,
supra note 147, at 693–94 (South Carolina Constitutional Convention debate on compulsory education).
228 See, e.g., 6 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 157, at 74 (urging the
matter of education be left to the “wisdom, experience and humanity of the Legislature”);
2 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF SOUTH CAROLINA, supra note 147, at 693–99 (debating whether
compulsory education should be left to the legislature).
229 See generally CREMIN, supra note 104, at 148–63 (discussing states’ adoption of compulsoryeducation laws); see, e.g., 4 CALIFORNIA FAMILY LAW § 60.02[1][b] (1990) (describing the parental duty
to educate children).
230 See, e.g., In re Welfare of B.A.B., 572 N.W.2d 776, 779 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) (holding a child
was in need of protective services because her parent was unwilling or unable to provide necessary
education); Doe v. Downey, 377 A.2d 626, 627–28 (N.J. 1977) (defining education in the context of child
226
227
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state intervention in the family and, if necessary, separating children from
their parents.231
These measures substantially interfere with and terminate a
fundamental right—a parent’s right to control her children—which normally
requires a compelling interest and clear and convincing evidence.232 The
Court, of course, has recognized states’ authority to regulate and interfere
with private education.233 The state’s interest in ensuring children’s access to
some baseline level of education is, the Court reasoned, sufficient to justify
the invasion of parental and private rights.234
The state’s legal authority to require that parents carry out their
“natural” duty to educate their children and to interfere with familial rights
and private schools, however, begs for more inquiry into the nature of the
state’s interests. The state’s interest might be understood as no more than a
discretionary public welfare interest.235 The Court in Pierce referenced a
general public welfare.236 But a general welfare interest is arguably too weak
to support certain substantial invasions of a fundamental right.237 Only

abuse or neglect as “parental encouragement to truancy of a school age child, or other interference with
normal educational processes”); In re W.U., 556 N.E.2d 887, 888 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (upholding the
termination of parental rights where a parent did not provide her child with the education required by
law); see also Kurtis A. Kemper, Annotation, Determination that Child Is Neglected or Dependent, or
that Parental Rights Should Be Terminated, on Basis that Parent Has Failed to Provide for Child’s
Education, 6 A.L.R. 161 (2005) (surveying cases).
231 See, e.g., W.U., 556 N.E.2d at 888 (upholding termination of parental rights for educational
neglect).
232 The parental right of control does not exempt the parent from general welfare regulation. See
generally Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166–68 (1944) (upholding the state’s power to enforce
child-labor laws that conflict with the parents’ desire to have their children assist in selling literature on
the city streets). Termination of rights, however, goes one step further than regulation and requires a more
substantial showing and set of procedures. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982)
(requiring clear and convincing evidence); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 72–73 (2000) (plurality
opinion) (indicating state courts should not “infringe on the fundamental right of parents to make child
rearing decisions”).
233 Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925).
234 See, e.g., id. (affirming government’s power to ensure “that certain studies plainly essential to
good citizenship [are] taught, and that nothing be taught which is manifestly inimical to the public
welfare”).
235 Responding to the notion that the state’s only interest in education is discretionary public welfare,
Professor Joshua Weishart argues that parens patriae doctrine translates into an affirmative duty to
protect children. Joshua E. Weishart, Aligning Education Rights and Remedies, 27 KAN. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 346, 364 (2018).
236 See 268 U.S. at 529.
237 See In re Custody of Smith, 969 P.2d 21, 28–29 (Wash. 1998) (explaining the federal precedent
and the predicate of a compelling interest); see also Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 13 (1981) (recognizing
that “substantial” and “compelling” individual interests at stake in a paternity dispute require the state to
provide additional procedural safeguards before invading those interests).
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compelling interests support such invasions.238 A state’s constitutional duty
to provide for a student’s constitutional right to receive education, for
instance, could presumptively outweigh a parent’s or private school’s
rights.239 A state’s general welfare interest in improving citizens’ skills and
knowledge, however, might not. No doubt, a less educated public would
exact societal and social costs, but the Court generally has been less receptive
to government action that compels or regulates private activity simply
because doing so produces benefits to society at large.240
The Court’s public education cases, likewise, contain their own
ambiguities but curiously align with the notion of a state educational duty or
student rights that would justify the invasions in parental-rights cases. The
Court has consistently alluded to that possibility.241 For instance, in San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, the Court rejected the
claim that unequal school funding alone violated a right to education but
specifically left open whether grossly inadequate educational opportunities
might.242 A “financing system occasioned an absolute denial of educational
opportunities” might, the Court allowed, violate a right “to acquire the basic
minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of the rights of speech and of full
participation in the political process.”243 The Court has reiterated this point
in other cases.244
A state’s authority to interfere with private schools and parents
curiously occurs at roughly the same point at which a state failure in public
education triggers the theoretical right in Rodriguez. The state can, as Pierce
indicated, intervene in private schools to ensure a basic education that is
“plainly essential to good citizenship.”245 And when the state provides
238

See Custody of Smith, 969 P.2d at 28–29.
See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534 (recognizing the state’s “power . . . reasonably to regulate all schools”
to ensure “studies plainly essential to good citizenship”).
240 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 548–58 (2012) (finding the Affordable
Care Act’s individual mandate could not be justified under the Commerce Clause despite the positive
effects it would have on health insurance costs).
241 See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 284 (1986); Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schs., 487 U.S.
450, 467 (1988); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 36–37 (1973).
242 411 U.S. at 36–37.
243 Id. at 37.
244 See, e.g., Papasan, 478 U.S. at 284 (stating that the Court is open to the idea that “some
identifiable quantum of education is a constitutionally protected prerequisite” to exercising the right to
vote or speak (quoting Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 36)); Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 467 (noting that the
Constitution is also concerned with sophisticated modes of discrimination).
245 Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925). The power to invade parental rights similarly
occurs when parents either fail to send their children to school or ensure some basic standard of education
at home. See, e.g., Kemper, supra note 230, at 161 (compiling cases that held that children were neglected
and in need of assistance due to factors including their absence from public schools).
239
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education, the Court has suggested that a claim might arise when the quality
of education falls below minimal adequacy.246 In other words, the state has
the power, in the case of private parties, and likely the duty, in the case of
public schools, to ensure students receive a minimally adequate education.
The Court’s decision in Plyler v. Doe,247 while maligned for its doctrinal
imprecision,248 offers a bridge between negative education rights and the
affirmative provision of public education. The state’s exclusion of
undocumented students from school in Plyler caused an injury worse than
simply failing to meet a theoretical minimally adequate education
standard.249 The Court indicated that the state cannot deny individuals “the
means to absorb the values and skills upon which our social order rests,”
impose “[t]he stigma of illiteracy [that] will mark [children] for the rest of
their lives,” or “deny [children] the ability to live within the structure of our
civic institutions” without a “substantial” state interest250—a more rigorous
requirement than the Court typically applies in rational basis review.251
In ruling for the student, the Court forced the state, as a practical matter,
to provide public education to the plaintiff class.252 It did so, however,
without explicitly articulating whether the right at stake was a negative or
positive education right. Instead, the Court blended the two concepts,
describing the harm in the language of negative rights—freedom from stigma
and exclusion—and ordering a remedy that resembles an affirmative right—
the state provision of public education to a student.253 In this respect, the
Court in Plyer went further than in Brown v. Board of Education. The Court
in Brown carefully refrained from ordering affirmative education, instead
246 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 36; see also Friedman & Solow, supra note 24, at 117–21 (arguing that
the Constitution should protect a right to a minimally adequate education).
247 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
248 See id. at 247 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“Whatever meaning or relevance this opaque observation
[(that education is not a right but not just social welfare either)] might have in some other context, it
simply has no bearing on the issues at hand. Indeed, it is never made clear what the Court’s opinion means
on this score.”); see also JUSTIN DRIVER, THE SCHOOLHOUSE GATE: PUBLIC EDUCATION, THE SUPREME
COURT, AND THE BATTLE FOR THE AMERICAN MIND 359–61 (2018) (discussing the Court’s refusal to
ever apply or expand Plyler’s holding outside its specific factual circumstances).
249 See 457 U.S. at 218–23.
250 Id. at 221–24.
251 Id. at 224 (requiring a “substantial goal”).
252 See id. at 230.
253 The majority’s decision in Plyler contradicts its holding in Rodriguez that education is not
fundamental. See id. at 247–48 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (pointing out the contradictions between the two
decisions). Professor Weishart’s scholarship, however, adds further nuance to the categorization of
education rights, explaining that they have often been enforced as immunities against state action rather
than “claim-rights.” Weishart, supra note 160, at 931–32; see also Scott R. Bauries, A Common Law
Constitutionalism for the Right to Education, 48 GA. L. REV. 949, 981 (2014) (drawing on the concept of
immunities in his analysis of the right to education).
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only ordering equal education when the state otherwise provided it.254 In
contrast, whether flowing from a negative or positive concept of education,
the Court in Plyer reached a conclusion that effectively translated into an
affirmative obligation to provide education.
Yet, no matter how one dissects these cases, they do not, as a matter of
existing doctrine, equal an affirmative right to education.255 The Court has
simply refused to rule the right out.256 The Court’s negative and positive
rights cases combined, however, offer another lens for considering the right.
And training that combined lens on history reveals that the negative right to
education is a huge explanatory factor in the evolution of the affirmative
right to public education. In fact, the most important constitutional sources
for an affirmative education right were born out of congressional action to
correct deprivations of negative education rights.257
The following Sections trace the historical and constitutional evolution
of the right to education. Over time, the nation learned from its errors and
recognized the need to affirmatively guarantee education.258 Congress’s and
the states’ historic exercise of constitutional power in furtherance of
education, then, provides the modern doctrinal basis for recognizing the right
to education. A fatal flaw of prior analysis has been to pigeonhole the right
to education into a single constitutional doctrine or idea. But Congress’s
actual exercise of constitutional power was multifaceted and grounded in its
understanding of the Thirteenth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and
Guarantee Clause.
B. The Thirteenth Amendment’s Impact on Education
The following Sections discuss the Thirteenth Amendment’s purpose
of eliminating both slavery and its lingering effects. The Court’s precedent
incorporates this broad purpose, holding that the Thirteenth Amendment
grants Congress the power to eliminate the badges and incidents of slavery.
Contemporaneous evidence indicates that the deprivation of education was
among those badges and incidents, which Congress could therefore remedy
pursuant to the Thirteenth Amendment.

254

347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
Black, supra note 22, at 740 n.17.
256 See Matthew A. Brunell, What Lawrence Brought for “Show and Tell”: The Non-Fundamental
Liberty Interest in a Minimally Adequate Education, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 343, 366 (2005) (“The
lower federal courts have interpreted Rodriguez as holding that education is not a fundamental right under
the Due Process Clause.”).
257 See supra notes 127–140 and accompanying text.
258 See infra notes 375–402 and accompanying text.
255
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1. The Badges and Incidents of Slavery
The point of the Thirteenth Amendment was to eliminate the vestiges
of slavery and guarantee freedom.259 Section One of the Thirteenth
Amendment prohibits “slavery” and “involuntary servitude.”260 Section Two
grants Congress “power to enforce” this prohibition through “appropriate
legislation.”261 The Framers intended this prohibition and congressional
power to reach beyond just human bondage itself.262 The Supreme Court has
consistently affirmed this broad understanding of the Thirteenth
Amendment.
In 1883 in the Civil Rights Cases, the Court explained that the
Thirteenth Amendment “nullif[ied] all State laws which establish or uphold
slavery. But it has a reflex character also, establishing and decreeing
universal civil and political freedom throughout the United States.”263 Thus,
Congress’s Section Two power included the “power to pass all laws
necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery in the
United States” and to “obliterat[e] and prevent[] . . . slavery with all its
badges and incidents.”264 Badges and incidents are “servitudes imposed by
the old law, or by long custom, which had the force of law, and exacted by
one man from another without the latter’s consent.”265 By way of example,
the Court listed:
[c]ompulsory service of the slave for the benefit of the master, restraint of his
movements except by the master’s will, disability to hold property, to make
contracts, to have a standing in court, to be a witness against a white person,
and such like burdens and incapacities[, and] . . . . [s]everer punishments for
crimes . . . on the slave than on free persons guilty of the same offences.266

These practices, the Court explained, impose on “those fundamental rights”
that mark “the essential distinction between freedom and slavery.”267
Drawing on contemporaneous uses of the terms, scholars have
distinguished badges from incidents. The incidents of slavery, most
narrowly, referred to “any legal right or restriction that necessarily

259 Carter, supra note 91, at 1331–32; ALEXANDER TSESIS, THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT AND
AMERICAN FREEDOM: A LEGAL HISTORY 3 (2004).
260 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
261 Id. § 2.
262
See Carter, supra note 91, at 1331–32; TSESIS, supra note 259, at 5.
263 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883).
264 Id. at 20–21.
265 Id. at 21.
266 Id. at 22.
267 Id.
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accompanied the institution of slavery.” 268 More specifically, incidents were
“the aspects of property law that applied to the ownership and transfer of
slaves [and] . . . the civil disabilities imposed on slaves by virtue of their
status as property.”269 Congressional debates identified limits on conjugal
relations, property ownership, testimony in court, freedom of speech, and the
ability to enforce rights in court as incidents of slavery too.270
Badges of slavery was a more general concept that overlapped with the
incidents of slavery. The phrase initially “refer[ed] to the color of an African
American’s skin or other indications of legal and social inferiority connected
with slavery.”271 After the Thirteenth Amendment’s passage, it referred to
legal efforts to target freedmen for discrimination and perpetuate their status
as slaves.272 The crucial distinction, however, is not between badges and
incidents but whether Section One of the Thirteenth Amendment prohibits
the badges and incidents through its own force or if Congress alone can
remedy them.
Logical Implications of Congress’s Broad Thirteenth Amendment
Authority
The Thirteenth Amendment was intended to root out the institution of
slavery, its peculiar customs, and its lingering effects.273 In doing so, it would
secure meaningful freedom for African-Americans, not just end slavery.274
Senator Sumner, for instance, argued that the Amendment “abolishes slavery
entirely . . . . [,] root and branch[,] . . . in the general and the particular[,] . . .
in length and breadth and then in every detail. . . . Any other interpretation
belittles the great amendment.”275 The Court has consistently affirmed this
2.

268

Jennifer Mason McAward, Defining the Badges and Incidents of Slavery, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
561, 575 (2012).
269 Id.; see also id. at 572 (describing other aspects of the incidents of slavery such as “the power of
the master to control a slave’s labor, food, clothing, and punishment; the slave’s status as chattel owned
by the master; the slave’s lack of enforceable property and contract rights; and the slave’s lack of standing
to sue the master or to obtain redress for cruel treatment”).
270 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1439 (1864) (statement of Sen. Harlan); CONG. GLOBE, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess. 322–23 (1866) (statement of Sen. Trumbull).
271 McAward, supra note 268, at 581.
272 Id.; see also Carter, supra note 91, at 1367 (discussing “de jure and de facto attempts to return
the freedmen to a condition of servitude and sub-humanity after formal emancipation”).
273 See James Gray Pope, Section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment and the Badges and Incidents of
Slavery, 65 UCLA L. REV. 426, 433–36 (2018) (discussing debates between members of Congress and
statements by African-American leaders on the intended scope of the Thirteenth Amendment); see also
Alexander Tsesis, Furthering American Freedom: Civil Rights and the Thirteenth Amendment, 45 B.C.
L. REV. 307, 323–28 (2004) (discussing how the Radical Republicans based the Thirteenth Amendment
on natural rights principles).
274 See Tsesis, supra note 273, at 323–28.
275 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 728 (1872) (statement of Sen. Sumner).
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intent in the context of justifying Congress’s extensive power to eradicate
the vestiges of slavery.276 It has largely left it to Congress to determine the
meaning and proper enforcement of badges and incidents itself.277
The Court has only hinted at whether Section One of the Thirteenth
Amendment also reaches the badges and incidents of slavery. In Palmer v.
Thompson, plaintiffs claimed that a city’s decision to close its swimming
pools rather than integrate them was a “badge or incident” of slavery.278 The
Court reasoned that, because the policy equally denied both white and Black
people access to swimming pools, overturning the policy as a badge or
incident of slavery would stretch the Thirteenth Amendment too far.279 But
in closing, the Court curiously suggested that the Thirteenth Amendment’s
prohibition on slavery might reach the badges and incidents of slavery if
“tax-supported swimming pools are being denied to one group because of
color and supplied to another.”280 The facts simply failed to raise that issue.281
In City of Memphis v. Greene,282 the Court again left open the possibility
of a Section One claim against badges and incidents of slavery. Plaintiffs
argued that the city’s decision to close a street that previously connected a
predominantly Black neighborhood to a white neighborhood imposed a
badge of slavery.283 The Court responded that the racially disparate impact of
the closure “could not, in any event, be fairly characterized as a badge or
incident of slavery.”284 But the Court again indicated it was not foreclosing
the possibility that Section One prohibits other modern practices that amount
to badges or incidents of slavery.285 Congress’s power to eliminate the badges
and incidents of slavery is, the Court wrote, “not inconsistent with the view
that the Amendment has self-executing force” and “‘[b]y its own unaided
276 See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20–21 (1883); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S.
409, 440 (1968) (“Surely Congress has the power under the Thirteenth Amendment rationally to
determine what are the badges and the incidents of slavery . . . .”).
277 See McAward, supra note 268, at 605; Alexander Tsesis, Congressional Authority to Interpret
the Thirteenth Amendment, 71 MD. L. REV. 40, 40 (2011); William M. Carter, Jr., Judicial Review of
Thirteenth Amendment Legislation: “Congruence and Proportionality” or “Necessary and Proper”?,
38 U. TOL. L. REV. 973, 973 (2007) (espousing a rationality review). Some suggest, however, that the
Court might apply a more restrictive proportionality and congruence test instead. Jennifer Mason
McAward, Congressional Authority to Interpret the Thirteenth Amendment: A Response to Professor
Tsesis, 71 MD. L. REV. 60, 62–63, 82 (2011).
278 403 U.S. 217, 226–27 (1971).
279 Id. at 226.
280 Id. at 226–27.
281 The Court was “almost inviting a citizen lawsuit to rely on Section 1 to petition for an injunction”
in a case that did involve a badge or incident of slavery. Tsesis, supra note 273, at 347.
282 451 U.S. 100 (1981).
283 See id. at 102–03, 124.
284 Id. at 126.
285 See id. at 125–26 (leaving the issue of whether Section One did more than abolish slavery “open”).
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force and effect,’ . . . ‘abolished slavery’ and ‘established universal
freedom.’”286
The Court’s approach to other Reconstruction Era Amendments further
supports the conclusion that Section One reaches beyond formal slavery. The
Court has held that the rights-creating clauses in the Fourteenth Amendment
are coextensive with its enforcement clause.287 Thus, Congress lacks the
power to remedy activities that are not themselves violations of Section One
of the Fourteenth Amendment.288 Similarly, in Shelby County v. Holder, the
Court struck down a portion of the Voting Rights Act because Congress was
regulating voting practices without sufficient evidence of Fifteenth
Amendment violations.289 Conversely, the Court has upheld expansive civil
rights legislation that proscribes activities that violate the Fourteenth
Amendment.290
Absent some compelling reason to treat the Thirteenth Amendment
differently,291 the logic of those cases suggests Section One of the Thirteenth
Amendment reaches beyond formal slavery. It would be inconsistent with
the Court’s Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment precedent to hold that
Congress can prohibit activities beyond formal slavery but the Thirteenth
Amendment itself does not reach those activities.292 Or, more simply, if
Section One of the Thirteenth Amendment only prohibits the formal
continuation of slavery, the Court’s precedent upholding broad
congressional power to root out the vestiges of slavery is wrong.

286

Id. at 125 (quoting Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439 (1968)).
See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997).
288 See id. at 519; see also Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank,
527 U.S. 627, 640 (1999) (identifying patent infringement as the conduct that must lead to the Fourteenth
Amendment violation Congress intended the Patent Remedy Act to redress); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents,
528 U.S. 62, 82–83 (2000) (finding the Age Discrimination in Employment Act to be “inappropriate
legislation” because it tried to remedy age discrimination activity that was constitutional under the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause); Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001)
(determining that there was not a pattern of discrimination that rose to a Fourteenth Amendment violation
that would justify Congress’s proposed remedy). Congress may, however, enact prophylactic legislation
to ensure violations do not occur, which may block some behavior that does not necessarily violate the
Constitution. See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 88; Nevada v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 721–22 (2003). But that
legislation is aimed at something that does violate the Constitution, not something that is permissible.
289 See 570 U.S. 529, 556–57 (2013).
290 See, e.g., Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 724, 735 (upholding the Family and Medical Leave Act); Tennessee
v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533–34 (2004) (holding that Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act is a
valid exercise of Congress’s authority).
291 Some, however, apply an inverse analysis that suggests the Court might constrain Congress’s
Thirteenth Amendment authority. McAward, supra note 268, at 607.
292 Professor William Carter notes that, while the Court has used the proportionality and congruence
test to shrink Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment power, it has done it in nonracial contexts and has been
more permissive as to race. Carter, supra note 277, at 985–88.
287

1073

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

This does not, however, mean that Sections One and Two of the
Thirteenth Amendment are precisely coextensive in every respect. It only
means that if Section Two categorically reaches beyond slavery, Section One
does too. A gray area can remain between the Sections because of the Court’s
and Congress’s distinctly different roles in enforcing the Constitution.293 The
Court has indicated that Congress can regulate some behavior that may not
be a core violation of the Constitution so long as the legislation’s overall
regulatory structure is aimed at remedying or preventing constitutional
violations.294 This leeway prevents the judiciary from intruding on
Congress’s independent authority to determine how best to legislatively
enforce the Constitution. This nuanced distinction between judicial and
legislative interpretation of the Constitution, however, does not change the
conclusion that if Congress has the power to remedy the badges and incidents
of slavery, those badges and incidents are violations of Section One of the
Thirteenth Amendment as well.
3. Section One’s Scope
If Section One prohibits more than just slavery, two categorical
possibilities exist for the scope of that broader reach. First, the Thirteenth
Amendment could prohibit only those laws and practices that directly
supported and reinforced African-Americans’ status as slaves. Second, the
Amendment could reach those rights and liberties necessary to secure full
freedom post-slavery. The narrower scope entails what Professor James Gray
Pope terms the “core” incidents of slavery itself and those key components
of oppression that accompanied slavery but which may not have been
necessary for its operation.295 The core incidents include “the master’s rights
to possess his slaves, dispose of their labor, and own the offspring of his
female slaves.”296 The components of oppression that accompanied slavery
include “race-based (or perhaps even non-race-based) barriers to owning
property, making and enforcing contracts, participating in court, marrying,
raising one’s children, and obtaining an education.”297
Justice Joseph Bradley’s reference to the “necessary incidents of
slavery” in the Civil Rights Cases reflects a similar understanding.298 The

293 See generally Flores, 521 U.S. at 519, 523–24 (holding that Congress can only enforce those
rights that the Court has interpreted the Constitution as protecting); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641,
648, 657–58 (1966) (upholding a Voting Rights Act provision as being a valid exercise of power even
though the activity it regulated does not specifically violate the Constitution).
294 Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 727–28.
295 Pope, supra note 273, at 465–66.
296 Id. at 429.
297 Id. at 429–30.
298 See 109 U.S. 3, 22 (1883).
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phrase alone rings of core incidents, but Justice Bradley’s lists of necessary
incidents also included what Professor Pope would categorize as components
of oppression that accompanied slavery. Justice Bradley included “those
fundamental rights which are the essence of civil freedom, namely, the same
right to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to
inherit, purchase, lease, sell, and convey property as is enjoyed by white
citizens.”299 The Court’s modern validation of Congress’s prohibition on real
estate discrimination is, moreover, consistent with Justice Bradley’s notion
that the badges and incidents of slavery reach beyond its core components.300
Some scholars forcefully interpret the Thirteenth Amendment’s scope even
more broadly to also include “a substantive assurance of freedom.”301 The
narrow interpretation, however, is sufficient for the purposes of this Article.
4. Educational Deprivation as a Badge and Incident of Slavery
The intentional denial of education as a means of perpetuating slavery
easily falls within the practices captured in the narrow interpretations of
Section One of the Thirteenth Amendment. As detailed throughout this
Article, educational deprivation was a tool for enslaving African-Americans
and remained a tangible and lingering badge or incident of slavery after the
War.302 Senators specifically listed the deprivation of education as an
incident of slavery, listing education alongside denials of the right to testify,
make familial decisions, and enter contracts—all of which whites possessed
and enslaved people did not.303 In short, the denial of education is in the
bundle of legal incidents that accompanied slavery.
Education denials, however, were also a core aspect of slavery rather
than just a form of oppression coinciding with or incidental to slavery.
Unlike familial rights,304 for instance, education—as conceptualized by
slaveholders—was subversive of and entirely incompatible with slavery.305
Thus, the South denied Black Americans education, not just to demarcate
their rights from whites, but also to keep them enslaved.306 The post-Civil
War effect of this core aspect of slavery, moreover, lingered for years and

299

Id. at 35.
See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 434–37 (1968).
301 See Tsesis, supra note 273, at 387.
302 See supra Section I.A.
303 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1439 (1864) (statement of Sen. Harlan); CONG. GLOBE, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess. 322–23 (1866) (statement of Sen. Trumbull).
304 See, e.g., PETER KOLCHIN, AMERICAN SLAVERY: 1619-1877, at 139 (2003) (stating that
slaveholders “were usually aware of, and considered themselves strong supporters of, slave families”).
305 See, e.g., DOUGLASS, supra note 45, at 42–44 (describing the unconventional methods Douglass
used to learn how to read and write, as he had no opportunities otherwise); supra Section I.A.1.
306 See supra Section I.A.1.
300
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decades,307 marking it as a badge of slavery that many African-Americans
went to extraordinary measures to remove. 308
Understanding the denial of education as a badge and core aspect of
slavery offers the justification for Congress to expand education and remedy
African-American illiteracy following the Civil War. The connection was
sufficiently clear that Congress’s authority to remedy formerly enslaved
people’s educational deprivations never seemed to be seriously called into
question. The Court’s later validation of legislation aimed at practices and
effects that were not core incidents of slavery, such as racial discrimination
in private property sales,309 only reinforces Congress’s authority to eliminate
and remedy the freedmen’s illiteracy, a core incident of slavery as previously
described. In fact, Congress’s continuing Thirteenth Amendment power to
guarantee racial equity in real estate310 raises questions of the extent to which
Congress might also address aspects of racially inequitable education
today.311 Congress could, for instance, theoretically mandate that states
provide Black Americans with the same quality of education as whites.312
Yet, such a power would still fall short of justifying the entirety of
Congress’s education agenda during Reconstruction, since that agenda was
to expand education for both white and Black Americans. Identifying
education as a badge and incident of slavery to remedy would be easy, but
once Congress’s post-Civil War education agenda went beyond that, it would
have required more authority than the Thirteenth Amendment could
provide.313
In sum, the foregoing Sections demonstrate three key points. First,
aspects of the right to education are directly grounded in slavery. Second, the
eradication of those aspects of slavery, including long after slavery, are

307 IES:NCES, National Assessment of Adult Literacy (NAAL): 120 Years of Literacy,
https://nces.ed.gov/naal/lit_history.asp [https://perma.cc/V2N7-BSLR] (indicating less than half of Black
Americans were literate until 1900).
308 SPAN, supra note 11, at 65 (outlining extraordinary measures African-Americans took to gain an
education).
309 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 413, 434–37 (1968).
310 The Court continued its adherence to Jones in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164,
190 (1989).
311 See, e.g., Brence D. Pernell, The Thirteenth Amendment and Equal Educational Opportunity,
39 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 420, 420 (2021) (arguing that the Thirteenth Amendment is a viable tool for
challenging racial disparities in school discipline).
312 Id.
313 Justice Bradley made just this argument in the lower court decision in United States v.
Cruikshank, 25 F. Cas. 707, 711 (C.C.D. La. 1874), aff’d on other grounds, 92 U.S. 542 (1875). See also
McAward, supra note 268, at 580–81 (discussing Justice William Woods’s opinion in a lower court case,
which argued that the power to remove badges of slavery does “not justify federal legislation to protect
the rights of white people, or even African-Americans who had not been slaves”).
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within the Thirteenth Amendment’s scope. Third, even if the Thirteenth
Amendment is short of the constitutional authority necessary for a general
fundamental right to education, it is an important part of the substrata and
overall justification for a general right to education. In fact, the Thirteenth
Amendment may be the most obvious constitutional provision to have
brought education within its scope—even if thus far undiagnosed. Before the
Fourteenth Amendment was even considered, the Thirteenth Amendment
provided protection for the freedmen’s right to education.
C. The Fourteenth Amendment
The next Sections discuss how the Fourteenth Amendment built upon
the rights established in the Thirteenth Amendment. The Fourteenth
Amendment’s extension of liberty and citizenship rights, in particular,
encompassed broader rights than those contained in the Thirteenth
Amendment’s guarantee of freedom from slavery. The implications for
education rights are substantial. Affirmative access to education was a
predicate to the liberty and citizenship the Fourteenth Amendment sought to
guarantee.
1. Individual Liberty
The Fourteenth Amendment, when understood in relationship to the
Thirteenth Amendment, provides the basis for education rights beyond those
implicated by slavery. The Thirteenth Amendment had only addressed the
immediate status and condition of enslaved African-Americans.
Guaranteeing full freedom and rights to African-Americans—not just the
end of slavery—required an additional step. The Fourteenth Amendment did
just that, extending full freedom and various subsidiary rights to AfricanAmericans.314 Even further, it extended those rights to everyone else in the
process. The Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause is the clearest
example of the transition and expansion of rights. The Thirteenth
Amendment granted freedom but not citizenship. The Fourteenth
Amendment cured that for African-Americans and everyone else too.315 The
Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of liberty likewise expanded on the
Thirteenth Amendment’s basic protection of freedom.316
This expansion is particularly important to education rights. Full
freedom and liberty for Black Americans and poor whites required more than
314

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
Id. § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,
are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.”).
316 See KARST, supra note 16, at 50–57 (explaining the interplay and broadening of rights between
the Thirteenth Amendment, Civil Rights Act of 1866, and Fourteenth Amendment); see also FONER,
supra note 116, at 255–61 (discussing the broader purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment).
315
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the negative right to pursue education.317 Thus, Congress took affirmative
steps to guarantee education in the aftermath of the War.318 Those steps,
moreover, directly intersected with the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment.319 As detailed in Section I.B.3, Congress forced Confederate
states to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment, rewrite their state constitutions,
and provide for public education in their constitutions as a condition of
readmission to the Union. These new constitutional education provisions did
more than remove barriers to the negative right to education; they
affirmatively ensured education for all through a new system of schools.320
This government-mandated provision of education represented a newly
conceived affirmative form of education liberty. History had shown—and
Congress and states recognized—that some liberties are pointless without
positive government action. Citizenship, personal liberty, and participation
in a self-government would be hollow concepts for the masses without
affirmative action.321 Removing state interference with education was not
enough. Unless government provided education, large swaths of citizens
would remain uneducated.322
In 1866, U.S. Representative Moulton stated the logic and immediacy
of affirmative education:
The two great pillars of our American Republic, upon which it rests, are
universal liberty and universal education. We have established universal liberty
through a bloody conflict, through four years of carnage and war, and Congress
by the passages of the civil rights bill has provided the machinery by which

317 See generally KARST, supra note 16, at 50–57 (describing inadequacies of the Thirteenth
Amendment at effecting full societal membership for Black people); FONER, supra note 116, at 255–56
(discussing the antidiscrimination and citizenship innovations of the Fourteenth Amendment); see also
ANNE NEWMAN, REALIZING EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS: ADVANCING SCHOOL REFORM THROUGH COURTS
AND COMMUNITIES 10, 15, 35–36 (2013) (theorizing why a positive entitlement to education is necessary
for cognitive autonomy).
318 See Black, supra note 22, at 741–43.
319 Id.
320 See, e.g., MISS. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, § 1 (mandating the creation of “a uniform system of
free public schools”); N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 2 (mandating the creation of “a general and uniform
system of Public Schools”).
321 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 1st Sess. 168 (1867) (statement of Sen. Morton) (reasoning
that education was “essential” to wresting power from the slaveholding elite and rebuilding the South).
322 See generally id. (“[W]e cannot expect the men who own the property voluntarily to tax
themselves to provide for education for others.”); id. at 167 (statement of Sen. Sumner) (discussing the
stark absence of education in the South). Congress, ironically, recognized this dynamic long before the
Court similarly acknowledged that the negative rights of procedural due process and a fair trial were
empty without the affirmative right to trial transcripts and counsel. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19
(1956); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355, 357 (1963).
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universal liberty can be enforced and guarant[e]ed . . . . One of these pillars,
then, rests upon a solid foundation. The other pillar is universal education. 323

Various state constitutional education clauses are even more direct,
proclaiming the governmental provision of public education is “essential to
the preservation of the rights and liberties of the people.”324
If there were any doubt of the link between the Fourteenth Amendment,
state constitutions, and the right to education, Congress eliminated the doubt
once the Fourteenth Amendment was officially ratified in 1868. At that
point, three Confederate states—Texas, Mississippi, and Virginia—
remained outside the Union.325 Congress explicitly conditioned their
readmission with statutory language: their state constitutions “shall never be
so amended or changed as to deprive any citizen or class of citizens of the
United States of the school rights and privileges secured by the [state]
constitution.”326
Not only is the timing with the Fourteenth Amendment crucial,
Congress’s reference to school “privileges” of “citizens of the United States”
invokes language very similar to the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges and
Immunities Clause. That Clause indicates that “[n]o state shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States.”327 The statutes’ prohibition on depriving “any citizen”
of the “right” of education also incorporates modern fundamental rights
logic, under which states cannot deprive any individual of the right to
liberty.328 This overlap is no surprise. Many scholars, including a Supreme
Court Justice, reason that Congress intended the Fourteenth Amendment
Privileges and Immunities Clause to serve as the repository of fundamental
rights, not the phrase “liberty” in the Due Process Clause.329 Regardless,
323 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3044 (1866) (statement of Rep. Moulton) (discussing the
creation of the Department of Education).
324 ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 1; see also MASS. CONST. pt. II, ch. V, § 2 (noting that wisdom
and knowledge are “necessary for the preservation of [the people’s] rights and liberties”);
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF SOUTH CAROLINA, supra note 147, at 264 (stating that education is
the best guarantee for the preservation of liberty).
325 Black, supra note 30, at 1066–67.
326 Act of Mar. 30, 1870, ch. 39, 16 Stat. 80, 81 (Texas); Act of Feb. 23, 1870, ch. 19, 16 Stat. 67,
68 (Mississippi); Act of Jan. 26, 1870, ch. 10, 16 Stat. 62, 63 (Virginia).
327 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
328 See, e.g., Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (protecting against “any
deprivation of life, liberty, or property . . . . ‘regardless of the fairness of the procedures used’” (quoting
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986))).
329 See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 527–28 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (indicating a
willingness to reevaluate the Privileges and Immunities Clause); Clarence Thomas, The Higher Law
Background of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
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Congress’s statutory language suggests it fully understood education to be a
right that falls squarely within what the Court would currently call a
fundamental right or liberty. Equally important, this education right was not
just the freedom to pursue learning free of interference but to have the
government affirmatively provide education—forever henceforth.
2. Equality and Citizenship
The full scope of what Congress and states did with education, likewise,
has enormous Fourteenth Amendment implications. Its actions served to
ensconce education as a formal, rather than just ideological, cornerstone of
the civic and social order. First, at Congress’s urging, education became the
service that all states have constitutionally obligated themselves to
provide.330 This includes oftentimes constitutionally framing education as
one of the state’s primary obligations to its people and an institution upon
which civic order rests.331 States have also forced every child to receive it.332
Second, understanding education as central to the citizenship that the
Fourteenth Amendment had just extended, Congress prohibited the final
readmitted states from denying education to any “class of citizens,” applying
an equal protection concept to a right of citizenship.333 Extensive evidence
from the myriad congressional actions, including debates surrounding the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, further demonstrates that Congress
understood and protected education as a right of citizenship under the
Fourteenth Amendment.334
Third, the Court itself, while never formally recognizing education as a
fundamental right, acknowledges the net result of these state and federal

POL’Y 63, 66–68 (1989) (discussing relation between natural rights and the Privileges or Immunities
Clause); Philip B. Kurland, The Privileges or Immunities Clause: “Its Hour Come Round at Last”?,
1972 WASH. U. L.Q. 405, 418–20 (positing the idea that the Court has laid the groundwork to move the
Privileges and Immunities Clause in a different direction from the Slaughter-House Cases).
330 See supra notes 325–326 and accompanying text; Derek W. Black, Reforming School Discipline,
111 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 10 (2016). To be sure, however, Congress was riding the wave of a common school
movement that predated the War and had increasingly gained cultural support. See generally CARL F.
KAESTLE, PILLARS OF THE REPUBLIC: COMMON SCHOOLS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY 1780-1860, at 95–
101 (1983) (recounting the common school movement of the early- and mid-1800s).
331 GA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1, para. I (describing education as a “primary obligation”); FLA. CONST.
art. IX, § 1 (explaining education as a “paramount duty of the state”); Seattle Sch. Dist. v. State, 585 P.2d
71, 91 (Wash. 1978) (indicating the state’s education duty is “paramount . . . [,] supreme, preeminent or
dominant”); Campbell County v. State, 907 P.2d 1238, 1257, 1259 (Wyo. 1995) (emphasizing that
education is established as a right in the state’s Declaration of Rights and necessary for “survival for the
democra[cy]”).
332 VICTORIA J. DODD, PRACTICAL EDUCATION LAW FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 9 (2003).
333 See Black, supra note 22, at 783.
334 See Liu, supra note 24, at 370; Black, supra note 22, at 793–97.
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actions: education is “the very foundation of good citizenship”335 and “has a
fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our society.”336 This factual
assessment, however, raises a problem with the Court’s precedent. The other
cornerstones of the civic and social order, such as voting and the judicial
system, unquestionably trigger heightened scrutiny.337 This raises the
question of why the Court has not done the same with education.
Even if the federal Constitution does not affirmatively guarantee access
to education, the notion that states could extend such a liberty- and
citizenship-enhancing right that rests at the center of the civic order, but then
afford certain groups unequal access to it, flies in the face of equal
protection.338 The Supreme Court in Obergefell v. Hodges, for instance,
explained that once states create such rights, equality must follow.339
Rejecting a false dichotomy between positive and negative rights,340 the
Court anchored its protection of marriage in the fact that marriage, by virtue
of states’ own voluntary action, is “a building block of our national
community.”341 The Court wrote:
States have contributed to the fundamental character of the marriage right by
placing that institution at the center of so many facets of the legal and social
order. . . . As the State itself makes marriage all the more precious by the
significance it attaches to it, exclusion from that status has the effect of teaching
that gays and lesbians are unequal in important respects. It demeans gays and
lesbians for the State to lock them out of a central institution of the Nation’s
society.342

In short, states must provide equal access to the cornerstones of the social
and civic order they create.

335

Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982).
337 See, e.g., Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (finding that restrictions on
voting must be “closely scrutinized and carefully confined”); Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 522–23
(2004) (explaining that restrictions on access to the courts are subject to “more searching judicial
review”).
338 See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 239 (Powell, J., concurring); see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633
(1996) (“[G]overnment and each of its parts remain open on impartial terms to all who seek its
assistance.”).
339 576 U.S. 644, 672–73 (2015).
340 Chief Justice John Roberts’s dissent in Obergefell implicitly invoked a distinction between
positive and negative rights to argue against the recognition of same-sex marriage as a fundamental right.
Id. at 702 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). He wrote that the plantiffs did “not seek privacy,” at least not in the
traditional sense of requesting that the state refrain from interfering with their relationship. Id. Rather,
they sought affirmative “public recognition of their relationships, along with corresponding government
benefits.” Id.
341 Id. at 669 (majority opinion).
342 Id. at 670.
336
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From this perspective, education’s treatment under equal protection
does not rest on whether the Constitution references or implies a right to
education, nor on whether the provision of education stems from state or
federal law.343 The question is, as a factual matter, whether government has
made education a cornerstone of civic and social life.344 The answer to that
question is yes in the context of education. As detailed throughout, Congress
and states have intentionally made it so. This history largely obviates the
relevance of any distinctions between positive and negative rights.345 Equal
protection simply demands that, upon making education a cornerstone of
civic and social life, government deliver education equally.346
D. The Guarantee Clause
The broadest and ironically least developed source for a right to
education, as well as the most direct congressional authority to impose such
a right, is the Guarantee Clause in Article IV of the Constitution. It provides
that “[t]he United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a
Republican Form of Government.”347 The Guarantee Clause, in particular,
was the source of Congress’s power to set the terms of readmission to the
Union and mandate that state constitutions provide for education.348 The open
question is not whether Congress imposed education through the Guarantee
Clause, but why it exercised that power nearly a century after the nation’s
founding, whether the exercise of power was valid, and what the implications
of that exercise of power are today.
The short answer is that the notion that education is a necessary
component of republican government dates back to the Founding Era. In the
initial years of the Republic, Congress did, in fact, take steps to ensure the
growth of public education.349 But those steps, over time, proved to be
insufficient. Congress had seemed to incorrectly believe that education
would solidify with just a little encouragement. The War brought those

343 Cf. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 766–67 (2013) (emphasizing that marriage was a
state right and equal protection applies regardless of whether the right is fundamental under the federal
Constitution).
344 See Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 669–71.
345 As Professor Weishart explains, the various distinctions one might make regarding the right to
education overlap and intertwine, and he posits “that the lodestar for the analysis is the right’s protection
function in securing children’s liberty and equality,” not necessarily those distinctions. Weishart, supra
note 160, at 922–23, 978.
346 See Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 672.
347 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
348 David S. Louk, Reconstructing the Congressional Guarantee of Republican Government,
73 VAND. L. REV. 673, 711, 744–45 (2020).
349 See Public Land Ordinance of 1785, supra note 20, at 565.
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failures to the fore, and Reconstruction provided the opportunity to correct
them. Thus, Congress forced states to constitutionalize education as a
necessity of republican government.350
The following Sections trace the nation’s historical arc to fully explain
and justify Congress’s use of the Guarantee Clause to secure public
education. Section III.D.1 explains Congress’s initial approach to achieving
the national ideal of an educated citizenry. Section III.D.2 explains the
perpetual practical failure to achieve that goal. Section III.D.3 frames
Congress’s exercise of Guarantee Clause power during Reconstruction as a
solution to prior eras’ failures and an attempt to finally realize a republican
form of government through the mandatory provision of education to all.
Section III.D.4 explores the limits on Congress’s Guarantee Clause power.
Section III.D.5 explains the implications of this history and power on the
right to education today.
1. The Founders’ Democratic Theory
At the nation’s infancy, government by common people was a radical
new idea, and public education was a centerpiece of making the idea work.
From Washington and Adams to Jefferson and Madison, the Founders
believed that education was a necessity on two counts. First, it was necessary
to equip common people with the means to preserve their own liberty351 and
responsibly participate in the political process.352 Education would allow
people to identify their own self-interests, work toward achieving them, and
guard their rights against others who might exploit or manipulate them in the
pursuit of countervailing interests.353
Second, the Founders worried that the new form of government with
which they were experimenting would implode without educated voters.354
Political power in the hands of individuals who lacked the capacity to find

350

See supra Section I.B.
See, e.g., George Washington, President of the United States, Eighth Annual Address (Dec. 7,
1796), reprinted in 1 JAMES D. RICHARDSON, A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE
PRESIDENTS 1789–1897, at 199, 202 (Washington, Gov’t Printing Off. 1896) (advocating for education
of young people from all quarters of society so as to guard liberty for the future); Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972) (summarizing Jefferson’s argument that education is necessary to the
preservation of freedom and independence).
352 Benjamin Rush, Of the Mode of Education Proper in a Republic, 1798: Selected Writings 87–89,
92, 94–96, in 1 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 686, 686 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987);
CARL F. KAESTLE, PILLARS OF THE REPUBLIC: COMMON SCHOOLS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY, 1780-1860,
at 6 (Eric Foner ed., 1983).
353 See Tory Lynn Richey, An Historical Inquiry into Thomas Jefferson’s Influence on the American
Education System 16–27 (Aug. 2009) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Denver) (on file with journal).
354 James Madison, To W. T. Barry, in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 103, 103 (Gaillard Hunt
ed., 1910).
351
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the common good could become a practical tool of perversion.355 Democracy
could dissolve into mob rule and extract resources from the wealthy
minority.356 Thus, mass education was also a safeguard against the
oppression of elites.357
John Adams was among the first to translate this democratic imperative
into constitutional doctrine. On the eve of the Revolution, he foreshadowed
the specifics of a post-independence democracy, writing that “[l]aws for the
liberal education of youth, especially of the lower class of people, are so
extremely wise and useful, that, to a humane and generous mind, no expense
for this purpose would be thought extravagant.”358 Post-independence,
Adams drafted the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780—the oldest
functioning constitution in the world359—and took education from a
democratic idea to a constitutional mandate.360 “[B]eing necessary for the
preservation of [the people’s] rights and liberties,” the constitution mandated
that “legislatures and magistrates, in all future periods of this
commonwealth, [shall] cherish the . . . public schools, [and] grammarschools in the towns.”361
Some other states copied this idea in their constitutions,362 but more
significantly, Congress embedded this democratic theory of education in the
national plan for growth and expansion—the Northwest Ordinances of 1785
and 1787. The 1785 Ordinance required every town to reserve one of its four
center lots for schools and one-ninth of its total land and one-third of its
natural resources to financially support the schools.363 In doing so, Congress
mandated a system of public education two years before the U.S.
Constitution existed. The Northwest Ordinance of 1787, with words echoing
355 See A Bill for the More General Diffusion of Knowledge, THOMAS JEFFERSON
ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://www.monticello.org/site/research-and-collections/bill-more-general-diffusionknowledge [https://perma.cc/T934-D2JZ].
356 See John Adams, A Dissertation on the Canon and Feudal Law, in 3 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS
447, 457 (Charles Francis Adams ed., Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1865) (indicating that public
education was “of more consequence to the rich themselves”); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 55, at 373–
74 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (advocating that a system of electing representatives of
a sufficient number every two years would prevent the ultimate danger of a small group of individuals
engaging in tyranny or conspiracy through legislation or falling victim to corruption).
357 Adams, supra note 356, at 457.
358 John Adams, Thoughts on Government, in THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 356, at 189,
199.
359 John Adams & the Massachusetts Constitution, MASS. CT. SYS., https://www.mass.gov/
guides/john-adams-the-massachusetts-constitution [https://perma.cc/BW4W-8HPR].
360 GEORGE THOMAS, THE FOUNDERS AND THE IDEA OF A NATIONAL UNIVERSITY: CONSTITUTING
THE AMERICAN MIND 108 (2015).
361 MASS. CONST. of 1780, ch. V, § 2.
362 See Eastman, supra note 221, at 10.
363 Public Land Ordinance of 1785, supra note 20, at 565–66.
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the Massachusetts Constitution, explained the rationale: as a necessity of
“good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of
education shall forever be encouraged.”364 This declaration, moreover,
resided alongside the Ordinance’s articulation of several individual rights
and liberties—familiar rights regarding religion, “trial by jury,” bail, “cruel
and unusual punishment,” and “liberty or property” that were later
incorporated into the Constitution’s Bill of Rights.365
The Northwest Ordinance of 1787, moreover, was directly intertwined
with the U.S. Constitution’s adoption and substance—so much so that many
scholars characterize the Ordinance as “in some sense constitutional.”366
First, it articulated several rights, such as freedom of religion, trial by jury, a
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, and protection of liberty
and property, that would later find their place in the Bill of Rights.367 Second,
several Constitutional Convention delegates simultaneously served in the
Continental Congress.368 In fact, during the summer of 1787, some
Constitutional Convention delegates had to leave the Convention to establish
a quorum in Congress to pass the Northwest Ordinance—what the Secretary
described as “absolutely necessary for the great purpose of the union.”369
Third, the Northwest Ordinances were the documents that made the
Constitution possible.370 Under the Articles of Confederation, states were
merely in “a firm league of friendship with each other.”371 As independents,
multiple states asserted competing claims to the western territories.372
Resolving these disputes, ceding the territories to a national government, and
devising evenhanded rules for incorporating territories as new states was a
predicate step for transitioning from a league of friends to a unified nation.373
364 Ordinance of 1787: The Northwest Territorial Government, reprinted in The Organic Laws of the
United States, 1 U.S.C. XLV, LVII–LIX (2018).
365 Id. at LVIII–LIX.
366 Denis P. Duffey, The Northwest Ordinance as a Constitutional Document, 95 COLUM. L. REV.
929, 931 (1995) (citing several scholars).
367 See JAMES A. CURRY, RICHARD B. RILEY & RICHARD M. BATTISTONI, CONSTITUTIONAL
GOVERNMENT: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 54 (10th ed. 1989).
368 George Anastaplo, The Constitution at Two Hundred: Explorations, 22 TEX. TECH L. REV. 967,
1100 (1991) (indicating forty-two of fifty-five delegates to the Constitutional Convention served in the
Continental Congress at some point, with ten serving concurrently).
369 MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, THE FRAMERS’ COUP: THE MAKING OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION 296 (2016).
370 Jonathan Hughes, The Great Land Ordinances: Colonial America’s Thumbprint on History, in
ESSAYS ON THE ECONOMY OF THE OLD NORTHWEST 1, 1–3 (David C. Klingaman & Richard K. Vedder
eds., 1987); Duffey, supra note 366, at 935–39.
371 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1777, art. III.
372 Northwest Ordinance and Slavery, in 1 RACE AND ETHNICITY IN AMERICA: FROM PRE-CONTACT
TO THE PRESENT 144, 144 (Russell M. Lawson & Benjamin A. Lawson eds., 2019).
373 See id.
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The Northwest Ordinances did just that, establishing the groundwork and
principles for what would eventually be thirty new states—basically all the
states except the original colonies.374
2. Practical Shortcomings
By the mid-1800s, the United States provided equal or more access to
education than any nation in the world save Prussia.375 But measured against
the idea of a fully educated self-governing citizenry, education remained too
limited. Setting aside land and rhetorically encouraging education had not
ensured uniform access to education.376 Through the first half of the 1800s,
Northeastern states were the only ones to operate anything resembling a
system of education.377 Yet even there, public education struggled to secure
the resources necessary to support a robust statewide system.378 Education in
the territories and developing states was even more challenging. The
population was sparser and the communities newly developing.379 Although
Congress had theoretically given the territories a jump start with land grants
and rules, the land was often mismanaged or failed to generate the resources
necessary to properly finance education.380 The result was inconsistent and
inadequate schooling. The South faced both practical and ideological
challenges. The South, as detailed above, criminalized the education of
Black Americans and blocked public education for whites as well, for
ideological, political, and tax reasons.381
The principle of self-government had likewise stalled. Women and
African-Americans could not vote at all, even in the North. Often the only
people who could vote were white male landowners or taxpayers.382 The
combined reality of lagging education and access to the ballot box meant that
374 The Northwest Ordinances were the “institutional thumbprint on the American continent all the
way from the Ohio River to the Pacific.” Hughes, supra note 370, at 1–2.
375 Sun Go & Peter Lindert, The Uneven Rise of American Public Schools to 1850, 70 J. ECON. HIST.
1, 3 (2010).
376 See, e.g., DAVID MCCULLOUGH, THE PIONEERS: THE HEROIC STORY OF THE SETTLERS WHO
BROUGHT THE AMERICAN IDEAL 197–217 (2019) (describing the “gap between the dream and reality” of
education in Ohio as immense).
377 See NEEM, supra note 115, at 71–72.
378 Id.
379 See, e.g., MCCULLOUGH, supra note 376, at 197–217 (“Cleveland had a population of little more
than 1,000 but also one of the best harbors on the lake and was growing rapidly.”).
380 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3044–45 (statement of Rep. Moulton) (1866)
(discussing mismanagement in Illinois).
381 Cf. Leviton & Joseph, supra note 18, at 1156 (discussing resistance to creation of public schools
in post-Civil War Maryland).
382 Stanley L. Engerman & Kenneth L. Sokoloff, The Evolution of Suffrage Institutions in the New
World, 65 J. ECON. HIST. 891, 907–08 (2005); Arthur W. Bromage, Literacy and the Electorate, 24 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 946, 946–47 (1930).
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much of the nation was not operating as anything approaching a democracy.
And the South, of course, had actively suppressed not just public education
and the ballot box but the basic human liberty and freedom of AfricanAmericans. The Civil War brought these contradictions to the fore.
3. Guarantee Clause Authority as the Cure
Relying on states to act in good faith to operate a republican form of
government had, by the mid-1800s, left the nation fractured and uneven in
critical respects. Reconstruction provided Congress the opportunity to cure
these critical failures, particularly the lack of education, which leading
members of Congress believed had been a contributing factor to the Civil
War itself.383 Equally important, if the South was going to bring millions of
formerly enslaved people and poor whites into the electorate and finally
function as a democracy, the South had to educate its people.384 This would
require a more forceful congressional approach to education. Rather than
leaving education to chance, Congress forced Southern states to
constitutionally guarantee education.385
The constitutional context for making this education shift had also
radically changed. Unilaterally dictating terms to states would have been
unfathomable at the founding. The Constitution’s original framework was
premised on expansive state power and only created those federal powers
necessary to serve the states’ collective interests.386 The Founders were so
concerned with federal power intruding on state power and individual rights
that they devised internal checks and balances to slow the exercise of federal
power, even when such power clearly existed.387 The original Constitution

383 See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 1st Sess. 167 (1867) (statement of Sen. Sumner) (“A population
that could not read and write naturally failed to comprehend and appreciate a republican government.”);
CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 1333 (1870) (statement of Sen. Edmunds) (arguing that the lack of
education had played a role in the War).
384 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 1st Sess. 168 (1867) (statement of Sen. Morton) (arguing
that education of the masses was necessary to change the political balance in the South); see also Mark
A. Graber, The Second Freedmen’s Bureau Bill’s Constitution, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1361, 1364 (2016)
(detailing that republicans argued “education [was a] central condition[] of freedom and full citizenship”).
385 See supra Section I.B.2.
386 See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803) (noting that the
“constitution is written” so that the limits on federal power “may not be mistaken”).
387 See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 347–48 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)
(arguing for separation of power among the branches of government and the general need to check
government power); id. NO. 84, at 577 (Alexander Hamilton) (expressing concerns and responses to
runaway federal power); Kevin Maher, Like a Phoenix from the Ashes: Saenz v. Roe, the Right to Travel,
and the Resurrection of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 33 TEX. TECH
L. REV. 105, 109 (2001) (explaining how our checks and balances preserve federalism).
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did not include the Bill of Rights either.388 Even once adopted, the Bill of
Rights operated to limit the federal government, not states.389
The Reconstruction Amendments to the Constitution inverted this
balance of power. The Fourteenth Amendment, for the first time, included
the key phrase “no state shall” and, thereby, precluded states from invading
individual rights.390 It also granted Congress the revolutionary power to
regulate states in regard to individual rights.391 At that point, Congress, not
the Supreme Court, was empowered to be the primary guarantor of
individual rights.392 The Fifteenth Amendment adopted the same structure as
to voting.393 These changes literally reframed the constitutional structure.
States were no longer immune from unilateral federal causes of action,394 nor
free to infringe individual rights.395
This monumental shift also altered and intertwined with the meaning of
a republican form of government and Congress’s power to demand it.
Prospective states were agreeing to the Constitution in its amended form and
meaning, not the one that existed in 1787.396 With a post-Civil War
Constitution that reframed the relationship between citizens and their state
governments,397 Congress need not wait for a state to violate its relationship
with citizens. Congress could dictate statehood terms consistent with this

388

CHEMERINSKY, supra note 193, at 12.
Cf. Barron ex rel. Craig v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247 (1833) (“The
constitution was ordained and established by the people of the United States for themselves, for their own
government, and not for the government of the individual states.”).
390 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in
the Era of the Civil War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 863, 904 (1986) (discussing resistance
to the Fourteenth Amendment because it would absorb or substantially shrink state sovereignty).
391 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
392 Kaczorowski, supra note 390, at 867 (“[T]he congressional framers of the fourteenth amendment
and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 also believed that Congress possessed primary authority to secure the
civil rights of United States citizens.”).
393 See U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
394 See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (“Congress may, in determining what is
‘appropriate legislation’ for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment,
provide for private suits against States or state officials which are constitutionally impermissible in other
contexts.”).
395 See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment
protected a defendant’s right to effective appointment of counsel); see also Kaczorowski, supra note 390,
at 916–17 (explaining the fundamental change that the Fourteenth Amendment worked in limiting states’
power to infringe on individual rights).
396 See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 175 (1875).
397 Kaczorowski, supra note 390, at 910–17 (discussing how the Fourteenth Amendment delegated
to Congress a power to protect individual rights, which previously had been a power reserved to states).
389

1088

116:1031 (2022)

Freedom, Democracy, and the Right to Education

new relationship.398 This meant Congress had the power to impose education
as a right protected by the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments and as a
central component of a republican form of government in a way previously
beyond its presumed power. As Section I.B.3 detailed, that is exactly what
the Reconstruction Congress did, and states complied.
In exercising this power, Congress forced a redefined republican form
of government into practical existence. Before the Fourteenth Amendment
was proposed, less than half of state constitutions affirmatively guaranteed
education.399 After the Reconstruction Act, all the readmitted Southern states
guaranteed education, as did newly formed western states and several
Northern states (through voluntary amendments) over the next decade.400 By
1875, only one state—Connecticut—lacked an education clause, and even it
had a constitutional provision that helped fund education.401 The single state
to attempt to enter the Union without an education clause since
Reconstruction—New Mexico—saw Congress reject its petition for
statehood.402 Congress expected and then required New Mexico to create and
maintain public schools in its constitution.403
Constitutional Constraints on the Exercise of Congress’s
Constitutional Authority
Few Guarantee Clause cases have reached the Court and, of those, most
did not address the Clause’s substantive meaning because the Court reasoned
“the claims were nonjusticiable under the ‘political question’ doctrine.”404
The one notable exception is a prohibition on imposing special burdens on
new states.405 Congress cannot, in effect, relegate new states to second-class
status.406 But given the broad implications of the Guarantee Clause, the Court
has been careful to defer to Congress as to its substantive meaning.
In 1849 in Luther v. Borden, the Court held that whether a government
is republican in form is a political question that rests with Congress, not the
4.

398 See, e.g., Joint Resolution to Admit the Territories of New Mexico and Arizona as States into the
Union upon an Equal Footing with the Original States, 37 Stat. 39 (Aug. 21, 1911) (admitting states
without dictating any terms or conditions).
399 Black, supra note 30, at 1093–94; Calabresi & Perl, supra note 158, at 457–60.
400 Black, supra note 30, at 1093–94.
401 Calabresi & Perl, supra note 158, at 457 n.130.
402 INST. FOR EDUC. EQUITY & OPPORTUNITY, supra note 155, at 29.
403 See ROBERT W. LARSON, NEW MEXICO’S QUEST FOR STATEHOOD 1846–1912, at 266 (1968)
(stating requirement that New Mexico establish schools).
404 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 184 (1992) (citations omitted); Rome v. United States,
446 U.S. 156, 182 n.17 (1980); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 218–29 (1962).
405 See Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 580 (1911) (“[T]he constitutional equality of the States is
essential to the harmonious operation of the scheme upon which the Republic was organized.”).
406 Id. at 567–68.
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courts.407 Congress’s decision, moreover, “is binding on every other
department of the government, and [can] not be questioned in a judicial
tribunal.”408 The Court has, however, indicated elsewhere that the Clause
“impl[ies] the duty of such new State to provide itself with [a republican]
government, and impose[s] upon Congress the duty of seeing that such form
is not changed to one anti-republican.”409
Pursuant to this principle, a court would presumptively defer to
Congress’s judgement that education is a necessity of republican government
and states must guarantee it in their constitutions. If any Reconstruction Era
demand by Congress was subject to question, it was the requirement that
Confederate states ratify the Fourteenth Amendment. Some argued that this
requirement was beyond Congress’s power, but even on a similarly serious
claim, the Court has refused to second-guess Congress.410 Requiring
education as a component of republican government pales in comparison to
the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification, as education had long been
understood as a necessity of republican government. In short, the Court has
treated Congress’s understanding of the meaning of republican government
as effectively definitive.411
The only obvious limit on Congress’s Guarantee Clause power is the
“equal footing” doctrine, which prohibits Congress from imposing unique
burdens on new states.412 New states must have “all of the powers of
sovereignty” as other states.413 The most plausible objection to imposing
education through the Guarantee Clause might, ironically, be the equal
footing doctrine. Confederate states, particularly the last three whose
admissions were conditioned on education,414 could argue their education
condition was a unique burden.
The argument, however, would be misplaced on several grounds. First,
the equal footing doctrine does not constrain Congress’s authority to assess
and enforce a republican form of government. A condition can be unique so
long as it pertains to republican form of government. The Court in Coyle v.
407

48 U.S. 1, 38–40 (1849).
Id. at 42.
409 Coyle, 221 U.S. at 567–68.
410 See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 449–50 (1939).
411 See, e.g., Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219, 234 (1917) (“As has been decided
repeatedly, the question whether this guaranty has been violated is not a judicial but a political question,
committed to Congress and not to the courts.”); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Cases Under the Guarantee
Clause Should Be Justiciable, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 849, 863 (1994) (indicating that since Pacific States
the Court has left these questions to Congress).
412 Coyle, 221 U.S. at 567–68.
413 Id. at 573.
414 Supra notes 325–326 and accompanying text.
408
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Smith distinguished admission conditions that “are within the scope of the
conceded powers of Congress over the subject” of a republican form of
government and conditions that “restrict the powers of such new States in
respect of matters which would otherwise be exclusively within the sphere
of state power.”415 The equal footing doctrine prevents Congress from
misusing Guarantee Clause power to achieve the latter, not the former.416
Thus, insofar as education is necessary to a republican form of government
or otherwise within Congress’s power to address, the equal footing doctrine
is of little concern.
Second and more substantively, the meaning of a republican form of
government is neither static nor definite. The Court in Minor v. Happersett
explained that the “several provisions of the Constitution must be construed
in connection with the other parts of the instrument, and in the light of the
surrounding circumstances” to arrive at the meaning of a republican form of
government.417 As the circumstances and the Constitution itself change,
Congress can demand compliance with an evolved understanding of
republican government.418 The constitutional Amendments of the
Reconstruction Era, no doubt, substantially changed both the terms under
which existing states operated and the meaning of a republican form of
government. To state the obvious, Congress admitted slave states prior to the
Civil War and appropriately refused readmission to those states after the
War.419 Thus, the fact that a post-Civil War condition may have been new or
unique is not dispositive of Congress’s authority to impose it. The
fundamental question remains whether Congress was ensuring a republican
form of government when it imposed conditions on Confederate states, not
whether those conditions were new or unique.
The historical record leaves no doubt that Congress was acting on its
judgment that education was a necessity of republican government—just as
it had been since the American Founding.420 What had changed was simply
415

221 U.S. at 568.
Id.
417 See 88 U.S. 162, 175–76 (1875).
418 For instance, today Congress could condition the admission of a new state on the ability of
eighteen-year-olds to vote, even though such a condition would have been beyond Congress’s power in
1792. Louk, supra note 348, at 744–45.
419 Justice Harlan’s famous dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, for instance, argued that segregation
violated the Guarantee Clause in addition to equal protection. 163 U.S. 537, 563–64 (1896) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting); see also Chemerinsky, supra note 411, at 863–64 (arguing for a more robust
conceptualization of the protections afforded by the Guarantee Clause, namely that they are justiciable).
420 See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 1st Sess. 168 (1867) (statements of Sens. Patterson, Morton,
Hendricks & Sumner); see also A Century of Lawmaking, for a New Nation: U.S. Congressional
Documents and Debates, 1774–1875, H.R. J., 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 69 (1865) (including a resolution
416

1091

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

Congress’s recognition that a more proactive approach to ensuring
republican government through education was necessary.421 Requiring that
state constitutions conform to this new approach did not reduce Confederate
states to second-class status; it simply demanded that they comply with the
newly amended Constitution and republican government. Congress,
moreover, was entirely consistent regarding education once it arrived at this
new approach, never admitting another state to the Union without an
education clause.422 And again, by 1875, every state but one provided for
education in its constitution.423
Finally, Congress did, in fact, impose education conditions on new
states prior to the Civil War. The Northwest Ordinance’s explicit
requirement that the territories reserve land and resources for schools got
translated into statehood conditions,424 which the Court has enforced and
applied on several occasions. In 1855, for instance, the Court in Cooper v.
Roberts wrote that “Michigan was admitted to the Union, with the
unalterable condition ‘that every section No. 16, in every township . . . shall
be granted to the State for the use of schools.’”425 The purpose, the Court
wrote, was to “consecrate the same central section of every township of
every State which might be added to the federal system” to promote “good
government” by the spread of education. 426 Neither Michigan, nor any other
state, had been singled out; Congress had simply required these states “to
plant in the heart of every community the same sentiments of grateful
reverence for the wisdom, forecast, and magnanimous statesmanship of
those who framed the institutions for these new States, before the
constitution for the old had yet been modelled.”427 Thus, the Court in Roberts
and other cases treated those land provisions as valid and enforced them in
subsequent land disputes.428

directing the Joint Committee on Reconstruction to investigate the creation of a Bureau of Education, in
furtherance of republican government); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3044 (1866) (statement of
Rep. Moulton) (arguing in favor of the Bureau of Education as a continuation of the republican principles
on which the nation was founded).
421 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3045 (1866) (statement of Rep. Moulton) (arguing
that prior efforts to establish and grow a public education system had failed in Illinois and additional steps
by Congress were necessary).
422 See INST. FOR EDUC. EQUITY & OPPORTUNITY, supra note 155, at 29.
423 Calabresi & Perl, supra note 158, at 458 n.132.
424 See, e.g., Cooper v. Roberts, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 173, 179 (1855) (affirming binding nature of the
pact to use lot No. 16 for schools as a part of agreement for Michigan to join the Union).
425 Id.; see also id. at 178 (discussing the establishment of Ohio and the requirement of land
reservation for schools).
426 Id. at 178.
427 Id.
428 Id.; Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 U.S. 517, 523–24 (1877).
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5. Implications for the Right to Education
The Guarantee Clause implicates at least three distinct types of
education claims. First, a plaintiff might claim that a state is directly violating
the Guarantee Clause because its education system falls short of what a
republican form of government requires. In other words, the Guarantee
Clause independently establishes a right to education. Second, a plaintiff
might assert that education is a fundamental right of substantive due process
and cite the Guarantee Clause, among other provisions, as constitutional
support. Third, a plaintiff might claim that a state has violated its statutory
terms of admission to the Union, thereby only indirectly implicating the
Guarantee Clause. The first claim is the broadest and the last the narrowest.
The Court has typically avoided the Guarantee Clause as a source of
rights and, instead, sought to locate rights elsewhere.429 Voting inequalities
and irregularities, for instance, present a strong Guarantee Clause claim.430
Early challenges to malapportioned voting districts relied on the Guarantee
Clause,431 arguing that affording some citizens more electoral power than
others distorts the will of the people and, thus, is not republican in form.432
The Court and scholars acknowledged the obvious logic, but when the Court
finally intervened in voting, it grounded its analysis in equal protection
instead.433
The prospects of the Court recognizing an independent claim to
education under the Guarantee Clause, when it has refrained from doing so
in voting, is low. This Article’s premise, however, is that the right to
education is rooted in various constitutional provisions and concepts. Thus,
the important question is whether the Guarantee Clause adds substantial
weight to the overall claim to a right to education. The answer to that is yes.
Education has been part of the nation’s theory of a republican form of
government since its founding, and the right to education vested in state
constitutions is inextricably linked to Congress’s exercise of its Guarantee
Clause power. These facts speak directly to the Court’s standard for
identifying fundamental rights: whether the right is “‘deeply rooted in this
Nation’s history and tradition’ and ‘implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty,’ such that ‘neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were

429 For example, in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 209 (1962), the Court did not rely on the Guarantee
Clause, even though it was implicated, and instead went to equal protection.
430 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 118–19 (1980).
431 Baker, 369 U.S. at 209.
432 Id. at 298 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
433 Id. at 209–10 (majority opinion); see generally ELY, supra note 430, at 117 n.* (explaining that
the Court could have avoided equal protection concerns in voting rights cases by deciding them based on
the Guarantee Clause).
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sacrificed.’”434 Guarantee Clause history alleviates some analytical pressures
on the Court in answering this question. Rather than recognizing a right to
education based on its own view of tradition and liberty, the Court could rely
on and defer to longstanding congressional action.435
A claim that a state is violating its terms of admission to the Union with
its education policies would even further isolate and relieve constitutional
pressures. Such a claim still requires historical inquiries into Congress’s
imposition of education through its Guarantee Clause power, but the claim
would not require a court to directly decide whether education is a
constitutionally required necessity of republican government. The most
obvious contexts in which to explore this history are Mississippi, Texas, and
Virginia, whose statutory readmissions were explicitly conditioned on
education during Reconstruction.436 In fact, Mississippi plaintiffs are
currently pursuing this theory. Recognizing the uphill battles of a direct state
or federal constitutional claim,437 the plaintiffs framed a federal statutory
claim that drew on the state’s constitutional history and alleged that
Mississippi is violating its 1870 terms of readmission with a state
constitutional education clause that currently affords fewer rights than the
state constitution of 1870.438
This Mississippi claim shifts the frame of reference away from today’s
conventional wisdom regarding the right to education and places the state on
the defensive in a way it otherwise would not be. Mississippi has clearly
violated its admission terms in the past and likely continues to do so today.439
Unable to easily contest those facts, the state’s primary defense is that it is
immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment and only Congress—and
not courts—can enforce readmission terms.440 While that line of argument
succeeded in the district court, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
disagreed.441 The Fifth Circuit reasoned that the legislation readmitting
434

Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997) (first quoting Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion); and then quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319, 325–26 (1937)).
435 The Court’s concern with intervening in complex education issues weighed heavily in San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 42 (1973).
436 Act of Mar. 30, 1870, ch. 39, 16 Stat. 80, 81 (Texas); Act of Feb. 23, 1870, ch. 19, 16 Stat. 67,
68 (Mississippi); Act of Jan. 26, 1870, ch. 10, 16 Stat. 62, 63 (Virginia).
437 See generally LaJuana Davis, Emerging School Finance Litigation in Mississippi, 36 MISS. C.L.
REV. 245 (2018) (discussing the difficulty in challenging Mississippi’s school inequities).
438 Williams v. Reeves, 954 F.3d 729, 732–33 (5th Cir. 2020).
439 See generally Davis, supra note 437, at 250 (discussing Mississippi’s voter disenfranchisement
and attempt to undermine Brown v. Board of Education).
440 See Brief of Appellees at 18–19, 46–51, Williams v. Bryant, No. 19-60069 (5th Cir. Apr. 24,
2019), 2019 WL 1961033, at *18–19, *46–51; Williams, 954 F.3d at 734–35.
441 Williams, 954 F.3d at 739.
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Mississippi to the Union was a federal law under which plaintiffs could
allege a claim and that the plaintiffs had alleged facts of an ongoing violation
of that law.442 Thus, they were entitled to proceed with the case.443 The court
did not have to address the myriad constitutional issues raised in this Article.
Statutory litigation of this sort, however, has its limits. While
Mississippi, Texas, and Virginia had their admission conditioned on the
nonregression of education rights, no other states had those precise terms.
Education terms of other states’ admission are less substantive and pertain
to the reservation of school lands.444 Terms of that nature would not
necessarily give rise to statutory claims regarding equity and adequacy in
schools. Admission and readmission litigation, nonetheless, has value
beyond the states in which it might occur.
If education admissions terms are enforceable against Mississippi,
Texas, and Virginia, for instance, it raises the question of whether those
terms do, in fact, amount to a necessity of republican form of government.
Enforcing those terms could, otherwise, implicitly create equal footing
concerns among states. But if courts can validly enforce the terms, the terms
represent an important building block both for republican form of
government theories and for the right to education under other constitutional
provisions. A measured statutory strategy for slowly exploring those broader
constitutional issues, moreover, would be akin to the NAACP’s strategy
prior to Brown v. Board of Education.445 It was only after the NAACP had
firmly established states’ failure to provide “separate but equal education” in
a series of other cases that it finally argued that separate education was
inherently unequal.446
442

Id. at 738.
Id. at 738–39.
444 Compare Act of Mar. 30, 1870, ch. 39, 16 Stat. 80, 81 (“[The] constitution of Texas shall never
be so amended or changed as to deprive any citizen or class of citizens of the United States of the school
rights and privileges secured by the constitution of said State.”), with Cooper v. Roberts, 59 U.S. 173,
178 (1855) (referencing Michigan’s admission: “The first of these articles is, ‘that the section No. 16 in
every township, and where such section has been sold, granted, or disposed of, other lands equivalent
thereto and most contiguous to the same, shall be granted to the inhabitants of such township, for the use
of schools’”).
445 For the definitive account of the NAACP strategy, see RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE
HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 283,
472, 522 (2004).
446 See, e.g., McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents, 339 U.S. 637, 642 (1950) (“Appellant, having been
admitted to a state-supported graduate school, must receive the same treatment at the hands of the state
as students of other races.”); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 345 (1938) (holding that
lack of legal education from the state to Black students, when such education is available to white
students, constitutes denial of equal protection); Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents, 332 U.S. 631, 632–33 (1948)
(holding that the denial of legal education to a Black student when such education is available to white
students is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause).
443
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CONCLUSION
Deeply concerned with common people’s access to public education,
the Founders developed a plan to provide it. Their animating ideas have been
with the nation ever since, guiding several of the nation’s most consequential
legislative and constitutional acts. At the nation’s two most pivotal periods—
Independence and Reconstruction—Congress embedded education in our
legal and constitutional fabric. The point was to secure an ideal form of
democracy.
Those plans and intentions, however, have never fully secured adequate
education for all. Securing adequate education, like so many other of our
constitutional ideas, has been a work in progress. The fact that the nation has
failed, as a practical matter, to achieve adequate education for all is not,
however, evidence that the right to education lacks a constitutional basis.
Rather, the nation’s past failures are a reminder, particularly during current
times of widening inequality and cultural division, that more affirmative
steps are necessary, including the formal recognition of the right to education
under the federal Constitution.
This Article demonstrates that this right is more complex and deeply
rooted than courts and scholars have ever appreciated. Pigeonholing
education into a single constitutional provision or Supreme Court test of
fundamental rights only weakens it. While the right to education easily meets
the Supreme Court’s fundamental rights test and most obviously emanates
from the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty, the right to
education is broader than that, reaching across multiple aspects of the
Constitution. It is, in effect, the tie that binds the Thirteenth Amendment’s
protection against the badges and incidents of slavery to the Fourteenth
Amendment’s guarantees of liberty, privileges and immunities, and
citizenship. And even more broadly, the right to education binds the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the constitutional guarantee of a
republican form of government. In short, the right to education is
fundamental not just to equal protection or liberty but to the structure of our
constitutional system of government itself.
These connections have been lost, in part, due to the legacy of Jim Crow
segregation and discrimination. Jim Crow laws and concepts did more than
subjugate Black Americans; they also submerged and distorted the history
of slavery, Reconstruction, and a republican form of government.447 The right
to education was just one of many innocent bystanders. But by carefully

447 See generally James W. Fox Jr., Intimations of Citizenship: Repressions and Expressions of Equal
Citizenship in the Era of Jim Crow, 50 HOW. L.J. 113, 130–61 (2006) (analyzing the various ways in
which Jim Crow subordinated democracy and its goals, including political participation).
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revisiting slavery and Reconstruction, this Article reveals what should
otherwise be relatively obvious: for decades, enslaved people made
unrelenting efforts to acquire education and, once free, many Black
Americans led a full-fledged movement to constitutionalize public
education—and succeeded.
That movement was bolstered by its direct alignment with the nation’s
founding understanding of a republican form of government and citizens’
role in it. Congress finally saw what enslaved people and freedmen already
knew: education is the dividing line between the various aspects of liberty
and subjugation. History had also taught an equally important lesson: liberty
and freedom would not exist as a practical matter without the affirmative
provision of public education. Thus, the right to education need not rest on
any grand new constitutional theories or the appalling facts of current
education deprivations. The right to education rests on reconnecting it to our
history and its lessons.
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